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Abstract
Modelling of hypothetical SARS-CoV-2 point of care tests
for routine testing in residential care homes: rapid
cost-effectiveness analysis
Matt Stevenson ,1* Andrew Metry 1 and Michael Messenger 2,3
1School of Health and Related Research (ScHARR), University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
2Personalised Medicine and Health, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
3NIHR Leeds Medtech and In Vitro Diagnostics Co-operative, Leeds, UK
*Corresponding author m.d.stevenson@sheffield.ac.uk
Background: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the virus that causes
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), which at the time of writing (January 2021) was responsible for
more than 2.25 million deaths worldwide and over 100,000 deaths in the UK. SARS-CoV-2 appears to
be highly transmissible and could rapidly spread in residential care homes.
Objective: The work undertaken aimed to estimate the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
viral detection point-of-care tests for detecting SARS-CoV-2 compared with laboratory-based tests in
the setting of a hypothetical care home facility for elderly residents.
Perspective/setting: The perspective was that of the NHS in 2020. The setting was a hypothetical care
home facility for elderly residents. Care homes with en suite rooms and with shared facilities were
modelled separately.
Methods: A discrete event simulation model was constructed to model individual residents and
simulate the spread of SARS-CoV-2 once it had entered the residential care facility. The numbers of
COVID-19-related deaths and critical cases were recorded in addition to the number of days spent
in isolation. Thirteen strategies involving different hypothetical SARS-CoV-2 tests were modelled.
Recently published desirable and acceptable target product profiles for SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care
tests and for hospital-based SARS-CoV-2 tests were modelled. Scenario analyses modelled early
release from isolation based on receipt of a negative SARS-CoV-2 test result and the impact of
vaccination. Incremental analyses were undertaken using both incremental cost-effectiveness
ratios and net monetary benefits.
Results: Cost-effectiveness results depended on the proportion of residential care facilities penetrated
by SARS-CoV-2. SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests with desirable target product profiles appear to have
high net monetary benefit values. In contrast, SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests with acceptable target
product profiles had low net monetary benefit values because of unnecessary isolations. The benefit
of allowing early release from isolation depended on whether or not the facility had en suite rooms.
The greater the assumed efficacy of vaccination, the lower the net monetary benefit values associated
with SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests, when assuming that a vaccine lowers the risk of contracting
SARS-CoV-2.
Limitations: There is considerable uncertainty in the values for key parameters within the model,
although calibration was undertaken in an attempt to mitigate this. Some degree of Monte Carlo
sampling error persists because of the timelines of the project. The example care home simulated will
also not match those of decision-makers deciding on the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
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introducing SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests. Given these limitations, the results should be taken as
indicative rather than definitive, particularly the cost-effectiveness results when the relative cost per
SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care test is uncertain.
Conclusions: SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests have considerable potential for benefit for use in
residential care facilities, but whether or not this materialises depends on the diagnostic accuracy and
costs of forthcoming SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests.
Future work: More accurate results would be obtained when there is more certainty on the diagnostic
accuracy of and the reduction in time to test result associated with SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests
when used in the context of residential care facilities, the proportion of care home penetrated by
SARS-CoV-2 and the levels of immunity once vaccination is administered. These parameters are
currently uncertain.
Funding: This report was commissioned by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Evidence
Synthesis programme as project number 132154. This project was funded by the NIHR Health
Technology Assessment programme and will be published in full in Health Technology Assessment;
Vol. 25, No. 39. See the NIHR Journals Library website for further project information.
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the virus that causes coronavirusdisease 2019 (COVID-19). SARS-CoV-2 is highly infectious, and this can cause problems in care
homes, where the virus can spread quickly. Laboratory-based tests can determine whether or not
someone has SARS-CoV-2, but these tests are not perfect and can take a long time to provide a result.
Point-of-care tests that can be performed quickly in the care home to detect SARS-CoV-2 are being
developed and they may have much shorter times to get a result than laboratory-based tests, although
with worse accuracy. The benefit of quicker tests is that decisions to put residents into or release them
from isolation can be made sooner, reducing the risk of spreading SARS-CoV-2 and reducing time in
isolation. The disadvantage of reduced accuracy is that wrong decisions could be made, resulting in
either unnecessary isolation or increased spread of SARS-CoV-2.
A computer model was built to explore the impact of using SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests for
residents of care homes. The model estimated the number of SARS-CoV-2 infections, deaths due
to COVID-19 and days in isolation. Strategies were run using different values, including the time
to get a test result back, the accuracy of tests, the proportion of care homes where there is a case of
SARS-CoV-2, whether residents were isolated individually or in groups and how well vaccines work.
The results of the model indicated that point-of-care tests could be good if there was a large decrease
in the time to get a test result back, if accuracy was high and if vaccination protection was moderate.
However, the accuracy and speed of future point-of-care tests is uncertain. When newer SARS-CoV-2
tests are available, the model will allow an estimate of the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
of the tests to be made.
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), which was identified in China
in 2019, is the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Worldwide, at the time of
writing (January 2021), the number of cases of COVID-19 was greater than 100 million and more than
2.25 million deaths were attributable to it. In the UK, the corresponding numbers were over 3.8 million
cases and over 100,000 deaths. SARS-CoV-2 appears to be highly transmissible and is spread primarily
through secretions from the nose or mouth, which can occur when coughing, sneezing or talking.
The risk of infection within a residential care facility could bear grave consequences, particularly for
vulnerable elderly residents with comorbidities. Currently, laboratory-based testing is relied on to
detect infections; however, it takes a considerable turnaround time to receive a test result. During this
time, a decision needs to be made on whether or not to isolate residents. Incorrectly isolating residents
can have an impact on their well-being, but incorrectly failing to isolate residents can result in the
rapid spread of SARS-CoV-2.
The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has released target product profiles for
point-of-care tests for SARS-CoV-2 that have a much quicker turnaround time to receive a test result
than laboratory-based testing, albeit with lower diagnostic accuracy. Desirable and acceptable target
product profiles were released; however, the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of these
target product profiles were unknown.
Objective
The objective of this study is to evaluate the expected clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
hypothetical point-of-care tests for SARS-CoV-2 when these are introduced into a residential care
home for routine testing of residents and staff, and to evaluate different strategies related to the use
of SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests and laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests.
Methods
As the tests were hypothetical, no systematic reviews of diagnostic accuracy were performed. As the
research was conducted to demanding deadlines, in agreement with the National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence, no systematic reviews were performed. Instead, scanning of published literature
and discussions with clinical experts were undertaken to identify literature sources for use in the
modelling. New evidence was being published continually and this would not have been picked up
using standard systematic review techniques.
A mathematical model was constructed using an individual patient simulation methodology to allow for
interactions (and the possible spread of infection) between residents, from residents to staff, from staff
to residents and between staff. The model was populated from data identified in the non-systematic
review. Outputs from a mathematical model included the number of infections among residents and staff,
the number of days spent in isolation, the numbers of simulated deaths from COVID-19, the numbers of
critical, non-fatal, cases of COVID-19, and the costs of testing. Calibration techniques were used to ensure
that the proportion of residents and staff infected associated with using the testing strategy in place at the
start of the COVID-19 pandemic was in line with published evidence. Thirteen strategies using SARS-CoV-2
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tests were initially modelled for four possible combinations of care homes (i.e. whether this was en suite or
had shared facilities, and whether the model started with an index SARS-CoV-2-infected resident or not)
and whether or not early release on receipt of a negative SARS-CoV-2 test was permitted. Ten additional
sensitivity analyses that varied parameter values were explored.
Owing to the large number of strategies evaluated and the potential that incremental cost-effectiveness
ratios may provide misleading results when there are very small absolute differences in terms of costs
and health benefits, a net monetary benefit approach was adopted, although full incremental analyses
were also presented. Strategies were evaluated that altered the assumed time to SARS-CoV-2 test
results and laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests, and the assumed diagnostic accuracy.
Results
Strategies with desirable target product profiles were most cost-effective, all other things being
equal, as were SARS-CoV-2 tests with better diagnostic accuracy. If a point-of-care test with the
characteristic of the desirable target product profile was available, then this would have a high net
monetary benefit regardless of whether or not early release from isolation was permitted. The
acceptable SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care test target profile product typically had lower net monetary
benefit than both the desirable target product profile and real-world evidence because of the
increased number of days spent in isolation by residents. The results remained robust with sensitivity
analyses varying population age, the prevalence of symptoms falsely suggesting COVID-19, the
proportion of asymptomatic cases and the proportion of residential care facilities that would be
penetrated by SARS-CoV-2. However, the net monetary benefit of a test was sensitive to its costs
and the assumed efficacy of vaccination, in addition to diagnostic accuracy and time to result. Some
strategies, for example those that have the acceptable target product profiles, have small numbers of
infections, but at the expense of markedly more days in isolation for residents, which is likely to be
associated with detrimental impacts on the residents. Exploratory analyses assessing the potential of
lateral flow testing show promising results; however, more data, including diagnostic accuracy and
failure rate data, particularly within a residential care facility setting, and more certainty in the costs
of a lateral flow test are needed to increase the robustness of these results.
Discussion
There was considerable uncertainty relating to parameters contained within the model, although this
was mitigated to some degree by the calibration undertaken. However, the results produced should not
be taken as definitive, but indicative only, with small levels of Monte Carlo sampling error remaining.
It is not certain the extent to which SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests would reduce the test turnaround
time, nor is it clear what the diagnostic accuracy of these tests will be; therefore, the results remain
hypothetical. It is noted that both factors are important drivers of the clinical effectiveness and
cost-effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests. The relative cost of point-of-care tests to
laboratory-based tests can also influence the estimated cost-effectiveness. However, a structure is in
place to quickly evaluate new SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests as these become available.
Conclusions
Given the heterogeneity of residential care facilities, no blanket result can be provided. This report
contains information that should be useful for decision-makers in assessing their own specific problem.
The modelling structure developed is anticipated to be useful for assessing the cost-effectiveness of
SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests as further information on the costs, turnaround times and diagnostic
accuracy of these tests becomes available.
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the virus that causes coronavirusdisease 2019 (COVID-19), which was identified in China in 2019. In January 2021, there had been
over 100 million cases of COVID-19 and more than 2.25 million deaths had been attributed to it
worldwide.1 Based on the reported number of cases, SARS-CoV-2 appears to be highly transmissible
and is spread primarily through secretions from the nose or mouth, which can occur when coughing,
sneezing or talking. Diagnosis of COVID-19 may not be straightforward. British Geriatrics Society
(BGS) guidance suggests traits that would make a COVID-19 diagnosis likely and those that would
be associated with possible COVID-19. The characteristics associated with a likely diagnosis are a
new continuous cough, a temperature of ≥ 37.8 °C, and loss of or change in normal sense of smell or
taste. The symptoms associated with possible COVID-19 are fairly generic and include new onset of
confusion and/or drowsiness, decreased mobility, diarrhoea or abdominal pain, and loss of appetite
and/or reduced oral intake.
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) scope2 details the exploratory economic
modelling of SARS-CoV-2 viral detection point-of-care tests (POCTs) and serology tests that is to be
undertaken. The scope covers a number of use cases, including hospitals, care homes, prisons and
general practice, and includes the use of both viral detection POCTs and serology tests. With the
agreement of NICE, this report covers a small portion of the scope, namely the clinical effectiveness
and cost-effectiveness of the use of viral detection POCTs in relation to use within residential care
facilities, with a focus on a care home for elderly residents. Previous work by the External Assessment
Group (EAG) has explored the use of SARS-CoV-2 testing when used at admission to hospital through
accident and emergency departments. Potential future work will focus on some of the remaining areas
in the scope.
The potential benefits of SARS-CoV-2 POCTs for those in residential care facilities will be, primarily,
the speed of obtaining the test result. A quicker test result may allow a decision to be made on whether
or not a resident can be released from isolation, or whether or not to isolate all residents if a positive
SARS-CoV-2 test result is received. The perspective taken was that of the NHS and Personal Social
Services, with prices in Great British pounds at 2020 values. The results presented provide an exploratory
evaluation of the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of hypothetical SARS-CoV-2 POCTs
compared with current laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests.
This work is atypical of a standard diagnostic assessment report (DAR) for NICE for the following
reasons. First, the SARS-CoV-2 POCTs being evaluated are hypothetical and, therefore, there may
be no results relevant to marketed tests. Second, as discussed, there is the fragmentation of the
scope, which will result in multiple reports. Third, and linked to the second point, the time allocated
for this DAR has been reduced markedly because of the importance of the topic and has been
completed within 7 weeks. Fourth, the software package used within this DAR, Simul8 (Simul8
Corporation, Glasgow, UK), is not one of NICE’s standard packages, but NICE consented to its
use, given the complexity of the decision problem and the reduced timelines. Fifth, owing to the
reduced timelines, it was agreed with NICE in the protocol2 that there would be no systematic
review related to the diagnostic accuracy of the performance of the tests. It was further anticipated
that the EAG would not ‘undertake systematic literature reviews for model parameters but will instead
use publicly available data from bodies such as Public Health England (PHE), request confidential
data from bodies such as PHE or rely on expert advice to populate the model’.2 The protocol also
states that the EAG:
. . . will try to keep abreast of newly published evidence relating to SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 and
anticipates that where NICE or the specialist committee members recruited to the Diagnostic
DOI: 10.3310/hta25390 Health Technology Assessment 2021 Vol. 25 No. 39
Copyright © 2021 Stevenson et al. This work was produced by Stevenson et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health and
Social Care. This is an Open Access publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 4.0 licence, which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, reproduction and adaption in any medium and for any purpose provided that it is properly attributed. See: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
For attribution the title, original author(s), the publication source – NIHR Journals Library, and the DOI of the publication must be cited.
1
Advisory Committee become aware of potentially relevant research that this would be signalled
to the EAG.
NICE.2 © NICE [2020] Exploratory Economic Modelling of SARS-CoV-2 Viral Detection Point of Care Tests
and Serology Tests. Final Scope. Available from www.nice.org.uk/guidance/gid-dg10038/documents/final-scope
All rights reserved. Subject to Notice of rights. NICE guidance is prepared for the National Health Service in
England. All NICE guidance is subject to regular review and may be updated or withdrawn. NICE accepts no
responsibility for the use of its content in this product/publication
Finally, given the complexity of the model, and the uncertainty around key variables within the model
the results produced should be taken as indicative rather than definitive to a greater extent than
results from other DARs.
The work covered in this report relates to residential care facilities. The majority of the modelling
relates to residential care facilities where the residents are elderly, although sensitivity analyses have
been undertaken to explore the impact if residents were younger.
The focus of the work is on comparing the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2
POCTs with laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests. The diagnostic accuracy for the SARS-CoV-2 tests
are taken from the target product profiles (TPPs) issued by the Medicines and Healthcare products
Regulatory Agency (MHRA),3 although data estimated from real-world use are also considered.
The SARS-CoV-2 tests are evaluated assuming that the current guidance is followed. However, in
calibrating the model, the circumstances prevalent at the start of the pandemic were modelled, which
did not include routine testing of residents or staff, unless they were symptomatic. The type of viral-
detection POCT was flexible, with the key characteristics being the time to produce a test result,
diagnostic accuracy and failure rate.
The outcomes in the model are the number of SARS-CoV-2 infections, the number of days spent
in isolation, the quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) lost (both from contracting COVID-19 and from
isolation) and the costs associated with testing. There is an inevitable trade-off between the complexity
of the model, construction time and running time. Simplifications have been made so that results can
be generated faster.
The EAG stresses that the work undertaken is largely based on hypothetical tests meeting the TPPs.
There is no certainty that SARS-CoV-2 POCTs can meet the criteria for turnaround times within
residential care facilities. If the TPPs for SARS-CoV-2 POCTs are not met, then the results within this
report relating to SARS-CoV-2 POCTs may be redundant. This point is made in guidance produced by
the BGS,4 which notes that many available POCTs for SARS-CoV-2 have not been validated for use in
care homes. The recent BGS guidance (updated on 18 November 2020) notes that:
Point-of-care tests should not be used in place of formal laboratory tests unless this approach is
specifically recommended either through government guidance or local Directors of Public Health and
Health Protection Teams. At the time of publication, this was not the case.
Reproduced with permission from BGS4
Research is under way that assesses diagnostic accuracy through organisations such as the COVID-19
National Diagnostic Research and Evaluation Platform (Oxford, UK).5
This work was discussed at a NICE Diagnostic Advisory Committee meeting. The process for such
appraisals includes patient and public involvement (PPI) representatives, who are involved in the
making of recommendations and present slides to comment on issues related to PPI. Therefore, no PPI
was sought by the EAG, which was to respond to any issue raised during the committee’s deliberations.
No such issues were explicitly raised to the EAG.
INTRODUCTION
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Chapter 2 The conceptual mathematical model
The conceptual model: residents and staff
The EAG spoke with topic experts to validate the proposed conceptual model and to highlight potential
sources of data that could populate the model. It was clear that there were potential areas in which
residential care facilities could differ in interpretation of past and current guidelines, and so the
model has been structured to allow an exploration of the changes in clinical effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2 tests under different underlying assumptions relating to SARS-CoV-2
test accuracy, actions taken on the result of the SARS-CoV-2 test, turnaround times for SARS-CoV-2
tests, configuration of the residential care facility and changed assumptions relating to the spread of
SARS-CoV-2 within the residential care facility.
The EAG modelled single bubbles within a care home. A simplified schematic of a typical residential
care facility ‘bubble’ is shown in Figure 1. It is assumed that a large residential care facility may have
multiple bubbles that could comprise different floors or wings, allowing residents to be separated
and prohibit mixing between different bubbles. The analyses presented focus on a bubble within a
residential care facility. Advice provided by care home representatives and experts indicated that
splitting larger residential care facilities into bubbles was commonplace.
Death
Outside the residential care facility











FIGURE 1 A simplified schematic of key elements in the modelling of a residential care facility.
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The use of SARS-CoV-2 testing, in particular the differences between laboratory-based tests and
POCTs, is not shown in this diagram, but will be discussed in this chapter. The pathway for residents
within Figure 1 is relatively simple. Within the residential care facility, residents are assumed to be
either in isolation or free to mix, maintaining social distancing where possible. Residents leave the
residential care facility when they die or when hospital treatment is required. Residents who have
died are replaced, following a delay, by new residents. Further details are provided in Detailing the
elements of Figure 1.
As the consequences of a resident contracting COVID-19 can be severe, including, potentially, death,
the modelling assumes a lifetime perspective. Discounting is undertaken at a rate of 3.5% per
annum for health, as recommended by NICE.6 Costs were considered in the initial year only and
are not discounted.
Detailing the elements of Figure 1
Each subsection discusses the assumptions and data sources associated with each element of Figure 1.
Non-isolated residents
This element simulates the day-to-day behaviour of residents who are not in isolation. This would
involve potentially interacting with other residents and members of staff. Further details on how
these interactions are modelled are provided in Chapter 3, Parameters relating to the simulated spread
of SARS-CoV-2 infection within the residential care facility.
Isolated residents
This element simulates the day-to-day behaviour of residents who are in isolation, where it is
assumed that they are confined to their room as much as possible and interaction is limited to
essential contacts. It is assumed that staff will attend to residents in isolation to provide food and
necessary support.
Residents are assumed to be isolated for the following reasons: (1) having symptoms that resemble
COVID-19, which may or may not be SARS-CoV-2 related, (2) having a positive SARS-CoV-2 test
and (3) because of a suspected SARS-CoV-2 case within the unit, in which case all residents are
isolated until it is believed that there is no longer a risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Further details on
the assumed likelihood of these reasons are provided in Chapter 3, The percentage of residents with
SARS-CoV-2 that are assumed to develop clinical symptoms and The incidence of diseases that are not
COVID-19 but have symptoms suggestive of COVID-19, along with a description of the criteria that are
assumed to be necessary for residents to be released from isolation. The model has the functionality
to change the third criterion so that residents are isolated on a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result
only, rather than on symptoms; however, this was not considered further as it is not in line with
current guidance.7
Staff
This element is divided into two broad groups: (1) staff without clinical symptoms and (2) staff with
clinical symptoms. It is assumed that staff members who have symptoms suggestive of COVID-19
would be withdrawn from duty and would not attend to residents. For simplicity, it has been assumed
that the staff member can be instantly replaced, although the EAG acknowledges that this would not
be the case in reality.
Staff members without symptoms were divided into two subelements: (1) those who attend to
residents in isolation and (2) those who attend to residents not in isolation. The number of staff in
each subelement is user-definable, although, for simplicity, no formal modelling of work shifts was
undertaken and, instead, all staff working across shifts were included and randomly selected to
attend to a resident.
THE CONCEPTUAL MATHEMATICAL MODEL
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It is assumed that when the entire unit is put into isolation because of a suspected SARS-CoV-2
case then all bar one staff member would attend to residents in isolation. One staff member is still
allocated to residents not in isolation so that there will always be a member of staff available to attend
to residents who may leave isolation earlier than other residents. As staff attend to more than one
resident, it is possible for a staff member with a SARS-CoV-2 infection to infect multiple residents and,
therefore, staff can be an indirect cause of the spread of SARS-CoV-2 from resident to resident. Staff
members with SARS-CoV-2 infection can also infect other staff members with whom they come into
contact. For simplicity in the modelling, it is assumed that staff members can infect only those staff
members in the same subelement (i.e. those treating residents in isolation or those treating residents not
in isolation). In addition, the implications of staff infected with SARS-CoV-2 spreading the virus within
the community, which could result in mortality, hospitalisation and increased pressure on the health
system, are not considered. This will be unfavourable to the strategies that have fewer staff infections.
The model assumes that staff members do not move between bubbles within a residential care facility.
It is noted that funds are available to care homes to support measures to stop the spread of SARS-CoV-2,
which include:
. . . limiting or cohorting staff to individual groups of residents or floors/wings, including segregation of
COVID-19 positive residents, for example paying for extra staff cover to provide the necessary level
of care and support to residents, or paying for structural/physical changes to support separation of
floors/wings and/or residents.
Reproduced from Department of Health and Social Care with permission.8
Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0
Requirement for hospitalisation
As detailed in Chapter 3, The proportion of residents with COVID-19 who experience severe consequences,
a resident in a residential care facility can require hospitalisation because of COVID-19-related causes
or because of other conditions. Owing to uncertainty in the data and the fact that hospitalisation for
non-COVID-19 causes should not be affected by the SARS-CoV-2 tests used, for simplicity, it was assumed
that no residents went to hospital other than for COVID-19-related reasons.
Death
As detailed in Chapter 3, The risk of non-COVID-19 mortality for residents, a resident in a residential care
facility can die from SARS-CoV-2-related causes or from another condition. It is also possible for
residents to die while receiving care for COVID-19 in hospital.
The conceptual model: introduction of SARS-CoV-2 to the residential
care facility
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 can be introduced into a residential care facility
in a number of ways, for example a staff member having caught SARS-CoV-2 in the community,
a resident having caught SARS-CoV-2 following a visit from a family member or from new residents
to the residential care facility arriving with a pre-existing SARS-CoV-2 infection. The probability of
these events happening are uncertain and may be rare. In addition, these events would require many
simulations to provide a robust answer, with many of these simulations consisting of a residential care
facility that remains free of SARS-CoV-2 throughout the modelling time horizon.
To counter this potential inefficiency, an alternative approach was adopted in which a seed who had
just been infected with SARS-CoV-2 infection was sown in the residential care facility. This seed
could be a result of an asymptomatic transmission from a visitor, new resident, residents attending
outpatient appointments or a member of staff. This seed could be either a resident or member of
staff (either attending to isolated or non-isolated residents) who has been infected with SARS-CoV-2;
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however, for time reasons, the model is run with a seed resident in the base case, although sensitivity
analyses explore the impact of the seed being a staff member. Each model run estimates the impact
on a residential care facility 90 days (3 months) after the seed penetrates the bubble. The 3-month
duration is arbitrary, as any (non-infinite) time point would not consider the full pathway of all potential
infections and 3 months was believed to be a reasonable period over which indicative results would
be useful. This aligned with the work for SARS-CoV-2 testing in hospitals, where the pressure in winter
was likely to be more acute. The seed will then progress through the relative stages of SARS-CoV-2
infection: becoming infectious, potentially becoming symptomatic (or remaining asymptomatic) and
then becoming non-infectious, if the seed did not die from COVID-19. While infectious, the seed has
the potential to infect both fellow residents and staff members, and these processes are described
in more detail in Chapter 3, Parameters relating to the simulated spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection within
the residential care facility. Longer durations were not run. However, it is unlikely that a longer time
horizon would alter the results because of the assumption that a bubble could be penetrated only once.
The results from the 3-month period are believed to be generalisable to longer periods.
The placement of the seed was at a random time point; therefore, the time to the next set of routine
testing for staff and residents (see Chapter 3, Testing strategies within the residential care facility) changed
between trials (see Chapter 4, The number of different random number streams used per analysis). The seed
was randomly chosen from all residents/staff within the residential care facility. It was assumed that only
one penetration of SARS-CoV-2 would occur within the 90-day period.
There will be no spread of SARS-CoV-2 for residential care facilities that remain clear of SARS-CoV-2
infection; however, there may still be differences in the results for POCTs and laboratory-based tests.
These results will depend on the specificity of the SARS-CoV-2 test used (as a false-positive result
can cause isolation) and on the time to a test result if early release from isolation is permitted (see
Chapter 4, The strategies modelled). Therefore, results have been run for residential care facilities that
are not simulated to have a SARS-CoV-2 infection.
Assumptions relating to the initiation of unit lockdown
Following a suspected SARS-CoV-2 case, it is anticipated that the unit will enter lockdown, with
all residents entering isolation following the government guidance.7 For larger residential care facilities
that have multiple floors and wings, it is assumed that only the specific bubble would enter lockdown.
The model has the functionality to use different criteria for the initiation of a lockdown, which change
the level of certainty required. In the model, the following criteria are available to initiate isolation
for all residents: symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 in a resident, symptoms suggestive of COVID-19
in a staff member, a positive SARS-CoV-2 result for a resident and a positive SARS-CoV-2 result for
a staff member. Initiating full lockdown on clinical symptoms alone has the advantage that this may
reduce the spread of SARS-CoV-2 within the residential care facility; however, it has the disadvantage
that residents would spend more time in isolation. Conversely, isolating the individual with symptoms
suggestive of COVID-19 but waiting for a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result to isolate all other residents
has the advantage that isolation is not as lengthy, but there is danger that SARS-CoV-2 could be
spreading within the residential care facility between the time of clinical symptoms and the time of the
SARS-CoV-2 test result.
The results presented in this report provide two broad configurations of residential care facilities.
The first residential care facility is assumed to be configured with single-occupancy rooms that have
en suite facilities. Therefore, it is assumed that, in lockdown, all residents are isolated in their individual
rooms and that there would be contact with only those members of staff attending to the resident.
The second configuration is to assume that the residents have shared rooms and bathrooms. In this instance,
it is assumed that residents have pre-assigned rooms and that these cannot be changed, even if a resident
THE CONCEPTUAL MATHEMATICAL MODEL
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were to show signs suggestive of COVID-19. In lockdown, people within the pre-assigned groupings would
continue to interact and would therefore have a possibility of spreading SARS-CoV-2. This configuration
is extreme and residential care facilities would attempt to segregate people with symptoms. However,
the results produced are expected to be useful to the NICE Diagnostics Advisory Committee.
The model has the functionality to examine an in-between configuration, where residents have single
rooms but need to share common facilities (e.g. a bathroom). In this configuration, the residents were
assigned to ‘sharing groups’ to reduce the spread of infection. One sharing group would be for residents
deemed to be at higher risk of having SARS-CoV-2 than the average resident. Residents falling into this
group would be known to have either a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result or to have symptoms suggestive
of COVID-19. All remaining residents would be allocated to the lower-risk sharing group. The higher-
and lower-risk sharing groups may also have subgroups if there are sufficient bathrooms to make this
possible. Although this functionality exists, results were not produced because of time constraints.
Assumptions related to the release of residents from isolation
Following a resident or staff member developing clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19, or a positive
SARS-CoV-2 test result in a resident or a staff member, all residents are isolated. The standard time in
isolation is assumed to be 14 days, as reported in guidance.7 However, the model has the functionality
for this duration to be shortened or extended in certain circumstances, if these options are selected.
The default option in the model is that all residents stay in isolation for 14 days once isolated,
with all residents tested following a resident/staff member displaying clinical symptoms suggestive
of SARS-CoV-2 or a resident/member of staff receiving a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result. This is
because residential care facility managers know that current SARS-CoV-2 tests have less than perfect
sensitivity, meaning that the test result may be a false negative. Some support for this approach is
provided in the BGS guidance,4 which states that residents with a negative SARS-CoV-2 test result
should not be released from isolation before a discussion with an appropriate physician is held, but
this also leaves an option for a resident to be released from isolation if deemed clinically appropriate.
To assess the impact of releasing residents from isolation early, the model has the functionality to
release residents from isolation provided that two criteria are met: (1) the resident has returned a
negative SARS-CoV-2 test and, in the shared facilities model and (2) the resident has not been in
shared facilities with a resident who has a positive SARS-CoV-2 test or symptoms suggestive of
COVID-19, a resident who is awaiting the result from a SARS-CoV-2 test or a ‘new’ resident, either
residing in the residential care facility for the first time or having returned from a stay in hospital
(see Chapter 3, The proportion of residents with COVID-19 who experience severe consequences). This
option has the advantage that residents have a reduced time in isolation, but does carry risk that
some SARS-CoV-2 test results could be false negatives and, consequently, SARS-CoV-2 could spread
within the residential care facility. It is anticipated that the default option and the early release option
will provide extreme positions with respect to the release of residents from isolation.
The model has the facility to allow all residents to be released from isolation if the resident suspected
of being the index case within the residential care facility has a negative SARS-CoV-2 test result.
An index case is defined as the first resident who is suspected of having SARS-CoV-2 infection when
the bubble is not in lockdown. If the option to release residents early is selected, then residents can
be released from isolation, provided that they meet the criteria in the paragraph above; however,
this option is more restrictive, as the SARS-CoV-2 test for the index resident must be negative for
all residents to be released. The model also assesses whether or not, in the time required for the
SARS-CoV-2 test to be returned, a resident has developed clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19.
In this scenario, the resident would also be required to have a negative SARS-CoV-2 test result before
the bubble is released from isolation.
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The rules for releasing residents from isolation, based on the possible model functionality, are provided
in Table 1. Although these options are implemented in a Boolean fashion, the EAG acknowledges that,
in reality, these decisions are likely to be nuanced and depend on resident characteristics and clinical
judgement, which cannot be incorporated into the model in the allocated timelines.
The model has an additional functionality to extend the isolation time for people already in isolation
when another incident occurs (either development of clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 or the
return of a positive SARS-CoV-2 test). This would require people already in isolation to be isolated for
a further 14 days, regardless of the time already spent in isolation, increasing the isolation time beyond
those in Table 1. This has the advantage that the resident is likely to be protected against SARS-CoV-2
infection, but has the disadvantage that the isolation time could be greatly increased.
Potential uncaptured benefits within the conceptual model
By necessity, the model did not capture all aspects of the decision problem; however, in the majority of
cases, this is unlikely to affect comparisons between POCTs and laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests.
POCTs may be disadvantaged by the following omissions: the introduction of POCTs could help reduce
the administrative burden associated with requesting and registering laboratory-based tests;9 could
potentially facilitate easier access to residential care facilities by allowing the required SARS-CoV-2
test to be carried out at the residential care facility and; in the future, could allow potential treatment
on identification of SARS-CoV-2 in symptomatic residents to be undertaken in a more timely manner
because of the quicker turnaround times associated with the tests. The EAG notes that trials are under
way to provide treatment for people with diagnosed COVID-19 to reduce the probability that it
develops into severe COVID-19.10
TABLE 1 The options for releasing residents from isolation
Allow early release from isolation if the SARS-CoV-2 test in index
resident is negative
Yes No
Allow early release from isolation
if the criteria are met
Yes Release resident provided that the criteria within the text related to
SARS-CoV-2 test results, other infectious diseases and ‘new’ residents
(see Assumptions related to the release of residents from isolation) are met
No All residents must isolate for 14 days
minimum unless the SARS-CoV-2 test
for the index resident is negative and
the criteria associated with early
release from isolation are met
All residents must isolate
for 14 days minimum
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Chapter 3 Population of the mathematical
model
Each subsection of this chapter discusses the assumptions and data sources associated withpopulating the model.
The demographics of residents in a residential care facility
The model sampled a starting age and determined a resident’s sex in accordance with published
Office for National Statistics data on care home populations in England in 2020.11 As the focus of the
main model was on residents in a care home for older people, only those residents aged ≥ 65 years
were considered (although younger residents were considered in sensitivity analyses). Table 2 shows
the age and sex distribution of the modelled cohort. Interpolation between age ranges was undertaken
to estimate the age of individual residents. The age breakdown was quite crude, with no statistics
reported for median or mean ages. The EAG has assumed that the age distribution of male residents in
the residential care facility can be approximated by a triangular distribution that has a mean of 83 years
(minimum 65 years, mode 83 years and maximum 100 years). For female residents in the residential
care facility, a triangular distribution that has a mean of 87 years (minimum 65 years, mode 96 years
and maximum 100 years) was used in the model.
For simplicity, neither ethnicity nor comorbidities were modelled. Where residential care facilities have
residents at a greater or lower risk of complications from COVID-19, this should be considered when
interpreting the results. Sensitivity analyses have been conducted to assess the impact of assuming
double QALY losses to consider cases where there are potentially worse consequences of COVID-19
and where more residents have severe SARS-CoV-2.
The characteristics of staff working in the residential care facility
At the start of the model, it is assumed that no staff have been infected by SARS-CoV-2 and that no
staff exhibit clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19. Age distributions, ethnicity and comorbidity
status for staff were not required, as the model does not explicitly take into consideration the
consequences of infection for staff beyond infecting other staff and residents.
TABLE 2 Age and sex characteristics of the care home modelled cohort
Age (years) Male (%) Female (%)
65–74 4.54 4.75
75–84 10.38 19.96
≥ 85 14.21 46.16
All ages 29.13 70.87
Note
Modelled approximations: male triangular distribution – minimum 65 years,
mode 83 years and maximum 100 years; female triangular distribution –
minimum 65 years, mode 96 years and maximum 100 years.
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The configuration of the residential care facility used in the main model
As described (see The conceptual model: residents and staff), the model focused on single bubbles in a
care home. From discussion with experts, it was clear that the size of bubbles was very heterogeneous
between real-world residential care facilities. To provide example results, it was assumed that
the bubble consisted of 16 residents (with demographics sampled in accordance with Table 2) and
nine staff members, initially divided into six staff attending residents not in isolation and three staff
attending residents in isolation. As a simplification, we have assumed that these staff are the full
pool of staff across the week and that staff starting and ending shifts are only implicitly considered.
Any resident–staff interaction involves a randomly chosen member from the staff pool and so not all
staff will be assumed to be working at all times.
Two types of residential care facilities were considered. The first type was a residential care facility in
which all rooms were en suite, in which case we assumed that, if lockdown were initiated, there would
be no interaction with other residents in the bubble. The second type was a residential care facility in
which it was assumed that the 16 residents were divided into four groups of four residents who shared
rooms and bathrooms.
New arrivals in the residential care facility
The model considers two types of new residents in the residential care facility bubble: (1) those who
have never been in the residential care facility and who are taking the place vacated by a resident who
has died and (2) those who are returning to the residential care facility after a stay in hospital.
In the calibration model (see Chapter 4, Calibration of the model), it has been assumed that residents
who die are not replaced. For the models tested, it has been assumed that there is a delay of 3 weeks
between a resident dying and a new resident entering the room. The new resident is assumed to have
had a recent negative SARS-CoV-2 test and to spend 14 days in isolation prior to being allowed to mix
freely with other residents within the bubble.
The percentage of residents with SARS-CoV-2 who are assumed to develop
clinical symptoms
There is considerable uncertainty related to the proportion of residents with SARS-CoV-2 who become
symptomatic. This estimate can range from 70%, reported by Smith et al.,12 to 19%, in the Vivaldi report,13
which reported that 5455 out of 6747 positive tests (81%) were in residents who were asymptomatic
and therefore 19% of residents were symptomatic. Other estimates include the following: 61% of people
with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 in a skilled nursing facility had clinical symptoms,14 56.2% of residents with
a positive SARS-CoV-2 test in six care homes in London had clinical symptoms15 and 33% of those who
tested positive in the community had clinical symptoms.16 Within these estimates, it is not always clear if
repeat testing was undertaken to establish whether or not the resident was pre-symptomatic and, if not,
it is likely that these values will be underestimates. In addition, the exact definition of clinical symptoms
is unclear. It has been noted in terms of the Vivaldi data that the definition of symptomatic was omitted
and that other symptoms in addition to new cough, fever and loss of taste and smell may be appropriate
in elderly care home residents.17
Given the wide range in results, we have assumed in our model base case that 50% of residents would
become symptomatic following infection with SARS-CoV-2. Sensitivity analyses were undertaken that
assumed that 33% of residents became symptomatic.
POPULATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
10
The incidence of diseases that are not COVID-19 but have symptoms
suggestive of COVID-19
For residents who have not been infected with SARS-CoV-2, the proportion of residents who have
symptoms that are indicative of COVID-19, but do not have COVID-19, was estimated from Hayward
et al.18 to be approximately 0.12 in vaccinated residents over a 147-day period, covering the winter
months and based on data for influenza-like illnesses. Assuming that a resident could have only one
influenza-like illness during this period, this would translate to an estimated daily risk of 0.087%.
A sensitivity analysis was undertaken using data from Smith et al.,12 who reported a daily incidence
of COVID-like symptoms of 1.1%, which was calculated using data from French emergency
departments, average daily incidence of influenza-like illness among older adults (50–99 years,
2008–2017) was used as a proxy attack rate for patients and staff presenting with COVID-like
symptoms of other aetiologies.12 The reported source was a conference abstract (Fouillet et al.19)
that does not mention influenza-like illness and, therefore, the robustness and generalisability of
the 1.1% value are uncertain.
For simplicity, it was assumed that residents in isolation could not catch an illness that had symptoms
suggestive of COVID-19. This could be unfavourable to strategies that allow early release, as it may
result in residents having a higher incidence of non-COVID-19 illness than those held in isolation.
The proportion of residents with COVID-19 who experience severe
consequences
Smith et al.12 reported that 20% of residents with COVID-19 have severe COVID-19. We have assumed
that this value is independent of age and that severe COVID-19 means that a resident either dies or
requires hospital care. It is acknowledged that there may be residents too frail to be transported to
hospital and these residents would not leave the residential care facility, but would have the same
outcomes as if hospital treatment were provided. The data for these probabilities were from a previous
report of exploratory economic modelling of hospital point-of-care SARS-CoV-2 viral detection tests
produced by the EAG20 and assumed to be the same as the proportion of people who died in hospital
with COVID-19 but who were not moved to the intensive care unit, presumably as they were too frail.
These values, for residents aged ≥ 65 years, are shown in Table 3.
Based on the previous report of exploratory economic modelling of hospital point-of-care SARS-CoV-2
viral detection tests produced by the EAG, the probabilities of death for residents hospitalised with
COVID-19 were calculated. These estimated values, conditional on age and sex, for people aged
≥ 65 years are provided in Table 4.
TABLE 3 Proportion of residents with severe COVID-19 assumed to remain in
the residential care facility rather than be transferred to hospital






≥ 90 0.940 0.924
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In the case of residents who require hospitalisation for COVID-19 reasons and then return to the
residential care facility, it was assumed that the length of stay was distributed log-normally (on a
log-scale) with a mean of 2.29 (standard deviation 0.59) days. This is in accordance with the time
allocated to residents aged > 70 years in the previous EAG report of exploratory economic modelling
of hospital point-of-care SARS-CoV-2 viral detection tests. This distribution was estimated from data in
Docherty et al.21 For simplicity, the costs of hospitalisation has not been included in the model. This will
be unfavourable to the strategies with fewer SARS-CoV-2 infections.
In the case of residents who die from COVID-19, the distribution of length of stay was represented by a
log-normal distribution with a mean of 2.00 (standard deviation 0.79) days, which was the distribution
used in the previous work undertaken by the EAG, relating to the use of SARS-CoV-2 tests in hospital,
and based on a study by Docherty et al.21
The risk of non-COVID-19 mortality for residents
Data on the number of people in care homes and the number of deaths per age band not involving
COVID-19 were taken from Office for National Statistics mortality data.22 The population data used
wider age bands (10-year bands) than the death data (5-year bands). Therefore, the EAG needed to
make the assumption that the population count in a specific 10-year band is equally divided between
the two included 5-year bands (e.g. the population data states that there are 15,838 males aged
between 65 and 74 years; therefore, we assumed 7919 males for each of the 65–69 years age band
and the 70–74 years age band). The estimated risk of death per 28-day period is shown in Table 5.
TABLE 4 The probability of death due to severe COVID-19
Age band (years)
Probability of deatha (%)
Probability of survival following
hospital treatmenta (%)
Male Female Male Female
< 15 1.93 1.33 98.07 98.67
15–19 4.44 1.94 95.56 98.06
20–24 4.65 2.65 95.35 97.35
25–29 4.51 1.91 95.49 98.09
30–34 3.68 2.78 96.32 97.22
35–39 4.52 3.22 95.48 96.78
40–44 6.55 5.45 93.45 94.55
45–49 8.82 6.82 91.18 93.18
50–54 12.77 10.67 87.23 89.33
55–59 19.90 12.70 80.10 87.30
60–64 26.66 22.76 73.34 77.24
65–69 35.47 32.67 64.53 67.33
70–74 48.22 40.12 51.78 59.88
75–79 54.95 47.65 45.05 52.35
80–84 59.40 50.50 40.60 49.50
85–89 60.95 47.75 39.05 52.25
≥ 90 63.78 49.38 36.22 50.62
a Not all residents would actually be transferred to a hospital (see Table 3 for details).
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Immunity from SARS-CoV-2 infection
It has been hypothesised that some people may have immunity to SARS-CoV-2 infection, although this
theory is subject to much debate.23 In the base case, it has been assumed that no person has immunity
to SARS-CoV-2 infection unless they had a SARS-CoV-2 infection at model initiation or were infected
with SARS-CoV-2 during the simulation. The model has the functionality to allow a proportion of
residents without current SARS-CoV-2 infection to be considered immune from infection.
Parameters relating to the simulated spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection
within the residential care facility
The model simulates the probability of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the following four categories:
(1) resident to resident, (2) resident to staff, (3) staff to resident and (4) staff to staff. These are controlled
by variables relating to the chance of a contact in which SARS-CoV-2 could be transmitted (termed an
effective contact), the likelihood of infection being transmitted given an effective contact (termed an
attack rate) and a calibration factor that attempts to ensure that the values used relating to effective
contacts and attack rates produce results that would be relatively consistent with those observed, to
date, within residential care facilities (see Chapter 4, Calibration of the model). To decrease the running
time of the model, it was assumed that the simulation of infections with SARS-CoV-2 occurred in
distinct 6-hour periods.
Effective contacts
In the absence of better data, the number of effective contacts in each category over a 6-hour period
deemed reasonable by the EAG was used with the knowledge that the absolute values would be
adjusted in the calibration process. Staff use of personal protective equipment could arguably be used
to adjust either effective contacts or attack rate, and we have applied its impact to effective contacts.
The duration of contact was used in conjunction with data from Smith et al.,12 who reported a transmission
probability of 0.14% per minute of contact. These parameters, in conjunction with attack rates, provided
ratios of staff and resident infections that appeared consistent with the data reported in the Vivaldi
report,13 which reported approximately three times more SARS-CoV-2 infections in residents than in
staff (20% vs 7%, respectively).13 The values used in the model are provided in Table 6.
Although the effective contacts can be a non-integer number, within each 6-hour period these are
probabilistically adjusted to an integer. For example, assuming 1.1 effective contacts between a
resident and another resident, there would be a 10% chance of two effective contacts being made
and a 90% chance of one effective contact. To improve computational efficiency, the contacts of only
infectious residents or staff are simulated. The code has been written so that the contacts are logically
TABLE 5 The assumed risk of death in a 28-day period from
non-COVID-19-related causes
Age band (years) Male (%) Female (%)






≥ 90 7.50 2.93
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consistent, such that if an infectious resident was assumed to contact another infectious resident, the
second resident would have one less randomly assigned contact than if they had not been simulated to
have already contacted an infectious resident.
Attack rates
Following an effective contact, the model determines whether or not infection has been passed by use
of an attack rate. The attack rate lies between 0 and 1, with this value being the probability that a
resident has become infected. Therefore, if the attack rate was 0.4, then, assuming that an infinite
number of residents were run through the model, 40% of those with an effective contact would
become infected with SARS-CoV-2 and 60% would not. In the model, the attack rate is assumed to be
based on the duration of the effective contact and whether or not the person with the SARS-CoV-2
infection is symptomatic. As shown in Table 6, the duration of all effective contacts was assumed to
be 8 minutes, with the exception of those involving staff members, which were assumed to last only
2 minutes. These values were loosely derived from data presented by Smith et al.,12 who suggested that
residents in geriatric wards had 47 minutes of cumulative contacts per day, with health-care workers
having fewer contacts. The previous work conducted by the EAG, which explored the use of POCTs
in accident and emergency departments, assumed that the attack rate for asymptomatic people was
69% that of symptomatic people. This value was based on data from Koh et al.24 and Grassly et al.,25
with input from specialist committee members of the NICE Diagnostic Advisory Committee.
Times to becoming infectious, developing symptoms if symptomatic and becoming
non-infectious for a resident infected with SARS-CoV-2 in hospital
Residents and staff who have been infected have defined periods before they become infectious,
have clinical symptoms (if the resident is to be symptomatic) and reach a point at which they are no
longer infectious for SARS-CoV-2. These values, along with their sources, are shown in Table 7. It has
been assumed that symptomatic and asymptomatic residents have the same time to key milestones,
although asymptomatic people have a lower probability of transmitting infection (see Attack rates).
These values are consistent with the data used in the previous work, with the exception of the time to
becoming non-infectious, which used data from Singanayagam et al.,28 and had previously been a sensitivity
analysis because of the timing of the identification for the previous publication. For our analysis, we have
assumed arbitrary uniform ranges to account for heterogeneity among residents.
The model updates disease progression every 6 simulated hours. This was believed to represent a
reasonable compromise between model complexity and sufficient accuracy, given the uncertainty in the
decision problem.
TABLE 6 The probability and duration of an effective contact within the residential care facility per 6-hour period
Description of contact
Assumed number of effective
contacts per 6-hour period
Assumed duration of effective
contacts (minutes)
Resident to resident (not in isolation) 1.10 8
Resident to resident (in isolation)a 0.20 8
Resident to staff member (independent
of isolation status)
0.05 8
Staff member to resident (not in isolation) 0.60 8
Staff member to resident (in isolation) 0.20 8
Staff member to staff member 0.03 2
a Only with residents isolated in the same room. Residents who have en suite rooms can therefore not directly infect
other residents during lockdown, although infection could occur indirectly through staff.
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Characteristics of the point-of-care tests and laboratory-based tests
The TPPs for POCTs and laboratory tests for SARS-CoV-2 are not linked to any marketed test, but
are values put forward by the MHRA to designate what would be seen as desirable or acceptable
characteristics for forthcoming tests. These values may bear no resemblance to the laboratory-based
tests that were used in the early phases of the pandemic and so the EAG decided to use values for
diagnostic accuracy from its previous work on the use of POCTs for SARS-CoV-2 in a hospital setting.
This resulted in an assumed sensitivity of laboratory-based tests of 89%, based on a meta-analysis
conducted by Kim et al.,29 with an assumed specificity of 1, following Grassly et al.25 The turnaround
time for laboratory-based tests for care homes in the early stages of the pandemic was estimated by
experts in the research team to be 3 days. It is believed that the turnaround times for laboratory-
based tests have improved over time, with data from NHS test and trace weekly reports30 reporting a
median time to test result of 45 hours. We have assumed that this equates to a mean time of 2 days.
The assumed diagnostic accuracies of the POCTs and laboratory-based tests, the times for the result to
become known by the treating physician and the failure rates used in the model base case are shown
in Table 8. It is assumed that neither the laboratory-based test nor the POCT can detect SARS-CoV-2
until 0.5 days after infection (based on Jarvis and Kelley33). The model uses a simplifying assumption
TABLE 7 The assumed distributions related to key milestones in disease progression
Event: time from element 1 to element 2
Assumed mean time
to the event (days) Source
Assumed
range (days)
Catching infection to becoming infectious 3.4 Clifford et al.26 2.5–4.3
Becoming infectious to having clinical
symptoms, if the resident is to develop them
2.3 He et al.27 1.6–3.0
Becoming infectious with SARS-CoV-2 to
becoming non-infectious
10.0 Singanayagam et al.28 8.0–12.0
TABLE 8 Assumed diagnostic accuracies, and times to obtain the test result and failure rates of POCTs and



















Calibration period 3 days 89.0 73.5 100.0 5.0
TPP (desirable) 2 days 99.0 81.8 99.0 0.2
TPP (acceptable) 2 days 95.0 78.5 95.0 1.0
Real-world evidence 2 days 89.0 73.5 100.0 5.0
SARS-CoV-2 POCT
TPP (desirable) 3 hours 97.0 80.1 99.0 1.0
TPP (acceptable) 3 hours 80.0 66.1 95.0 5.0
Data from currently
available POCTs
3.8 hours 84.7 70.0 98.9 5.0
Exploratory analyses only: lateral flow tests
PHE report31 30 minutes 85.9 70.9 99.7 5.0
Cochrane review32 30 minutes 69.1 57.1 99.7 5.0
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that SARS-CoV-2 cannot be detected until this point is reached, although false-positive tests could still
occur in this situation. Beyond this time point, the sensitivity values reported in Table 8 are considered
appropriate, which the EAG acknowledges as a simplification of viral load dynamics. It is believed
that the sensitivity of SARS-CoV-2 tests may be reduced in asymptomatic people. Based on data
provided in Clifford et al.,26 it was assumed that the ratio of sensitivities was 0.826, having assumed
0.75 sensitivity in symptomatic cases and 0.62 for asymptomatic cases.
The TPPs published by the MHRA were used for both the POCTs and laboratory-based tests.34,35
These were divided into desired and acceptable characteristics. The characteristics of these are presented
in Table 8. The estimate of 3 hours for the POCTs was made, considering that it is probable that there
would be only one POCT machine per residential care facility, and that swabs from residents and staff
members would need to be stored and be in a queue before being processed. As detailed in Testing strategies
within the residential care facility, a staggered approach to resident testing was employed; however, this
would not be possible when there is a suspected case of COVID-19. In the instance of a suspected case of
COVID-19, the average time to receive a result from a SARS-CoV-2 POCTwas assumed to increase to 1 day.
In addition, real-world evidence is explored, as has been used for the laboratory-based tests in the
calibration period. For SARS-CoV-2 POCTs, data from currently available SARS-CoV-2 POCTs were
used. These data suggest that the time to obtain the result is 3.8 hours (based on data presented in
Collier et al.36 and with sensitivity and specificity taken from a Cochrane review by Dinnes et al.,37
which were multiplied by the sensitivity and specificity of the real-world laboratory-based test
diagnostic accuracy). It is seen that the real-world evidence for the SARS-CoV-2 POCT has better
diagnostic accuracy than the acceptable TPP, with only a small increase in time to the test result,
which would not be captured in the model because of the model updating every 6 hours.
Additionally, recent (after the completion of work for NICE) diagnostic accuracy data from testing using
lateral flow methods in mass community testing have been reported,31 as has a Cochrane review.32
These data have been used in sensitivity analyses and assume that the tests would be undertaken
every 5 days for both staff and residents, and that the lateral flow test was £10 cheaper than the
other SARS-CoV-2 POCTs and laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests. From the mass community testing
report,31 the sensitivity for all individuals, irrespective of viral load, was assumed to be 85.85% (mid-way
between 77.8% and 93.9%) and specificity was assumed to be 99.68%, meaning that the diagnostic
accuracy of the lateral flow tests was similar to real-world evidence for POCTs. The failure rate was
maintained at 5%, despite a mid-point estimate of 5.4% (502/9276), as these data were skewed by the
observation from ‘phase 4, school 1’, which is reported to had 311 failures out of 2166 tests (14.4%)
and was also reported to have a 16.8% failure rate (the discrepancy between these numbers in not clear).
The mass community testing report suggests that there might be a difference in failure rates between
batches. If this is correct and the problem can be rectified, then the failure rates may decrease.
From the Cochrane report,32 sensitivity data for the four Instructions for Use-compliant evaluations
were taken from three evaluations of symptomatic patients (69.1%) and specificity data were taken
from two evaluations of symptomatic patients (99.7%). The assumed time to a result when using a
lateral flow test was 30 minutes. These data have been added to Table 8.
The lateral flow analyses were not appraised by the NICE Diagnostic Committee. Caveats to this
analysis include that the model does not include visitor testing, that confirmatory tests after a lateral
flow test have not been included, behaviour change has not been assumed, that incorrect diagnoses are
assumed to occur at random (as the diagnostic accuracy has not come from a strategy of repeated tests),
that no analyses increasing the frequency of other POCTs have been modelled and that sufficient data
to allow diagnostic accuracy specific to residential care facilities are not available. Therefore, conclusions
related to lateral flow tests should be considered indicative rather than definitive. Recent work that
assessed the implementation of staff and visitor testing protocols using lateral flow devices concluded
that there was poor adherence to using the tests and no reduction in either the number or scale of
COVID-19 outbreaks with the use of lateral flow tests.38
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The model has not considered the possibility that less well-trained staff could increase the spread of
SARS-CoV-2 when performing the tests. We have assumed that training has been undertaken with
care home staff to mitigate this.
Testing strategies in the residential care facility
In accordance with guidance,7 it was assumed that residents were tested every 28 days for SARS-CoV-2
and that asymptomatic staff members are tested weekly. In sensitivity analyses looking at lateral
flow SARS-CoV-2 tests, the testing strategy was changed to every 5 days for both residents and staff.
No analyses that reduced the frequency of testing for non-lateral flow POCTs were undertaken.
For residents, it was assumed that 16 residents are divided into four groups of four residents and
that testing was undertaken on 4 consecutive days so that a single POCT is not overwhelmed. It is
assumed that all asymptomatic staff members are tested in one batch, although, in reality, this would
be scheduled according to their working patterns. It is further assumed that, when there is a suspected
case of SARS-CoV-2 infection within the residential care facility, all residents and staff are tested
immediately, with the turnaround times for test results increased to 1 day.
The assumed costs of SARS-CoV-2 tests
In the earlier work undertaken by the EAG, the cost of the hypothetical POCTwas assumed to be
£27.76,39 which is based on the 5.8 million DnaNudge (London, UK) tests ordered by the government at
a cost of £161M, although it was acknowledged that, as the deal was likely to include 5000 platforms for
running the tests, this could overestimate the cost. For laboratory-based tests, the cost was assumed to
be £21.90,40 assuming that the cost of the urine and plasma laboratory-based test (BioPorto, Needham,
MA, USA) used to assess acute kidney failure for people considered for admission to critical care is a
reasonable proxy. The staff costs associated with POCTs and laboratory-based tests were assumed
to be equal.
At the previous Diagnostic Advisory Committee meeting, there was considerable discussion of the
relative costs of POCTs and laboratory-based tests for SARS-CoV-2. Some members contended that
the costs used were relatively favourable to POCTs, whereas others argued the opposite. In the light
of these discussions, and acknowledging the fact that the costs are uncertain, the costs were assumed
equal in the base case, and sensitivity analyses were performed to explore the impact of changes in the
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs). To facilitate a comparison with a strategy of no routine
testing (for academic interest), it was assumed that SARS-CoV-2 tests cost £22. All costs used within
the analyses are assumed to be in Great British pounds in 2020.
An exception was for the sensitivity analyses using lateral flow methods. In the exploratory analyses,
it was assumed that these would be £10 cheaper than the other tests, averaging £12 per test.
Quality-adjusted life-years lost because of COVID-19
The model estimates the additional discounted QALYs lost (assuming a discount rate of 3.5% per annum,
as recommended by NICE6) and life-years lost due to COVID-19. These values have been estimated
using data from Office for National Statistics life tables41 (2016–18) and age- and sex-adjusted general
population utility values reported from Ara and Brazier,42 which used estimated utility values from
26,679 people (aged 16–98 years) who completed EuroQol-5 Dimensions, three-level version (EQ-5D-3L),
questionnaires.42 The EAG acknowledges that these QALY losses will be overestimated if the average
utility for residents in a care home is lower than the average of people in England, and these are
conditional on the age and sex of people in England.
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Example values of the estimated QALY losses and life-years lost for selected ages are provided
in Table 9.
For residents who had severe COVID-19, a multiplier was applied to take into consideration the fact
that the QALYs gained would be lower than that of the average age- and sex-matched people because
of reduced life expectancy and/or reduced quality of life. As no data were found to populate these
multipliers, an arbitrary value of 0.9 was applied for residents who had severe COVID-19. This is
higher than the value (0.8) used in the earlier work undertaken by the EAG in a hospital setting,20
as the latter value was applied to only those people who had received care in an intensive care unit.
With the previous work undertaken by the EAG, the QALYs lost could be strongly influenced by
Monte Carlo sampling error (MCSE) (i.e. the differences in results purely because of the random numbers
used) and so an evaluation was undertaken with the full runs completed at the time of the analysis.
The results were influenced less by MCSE, but the EAG still thought it prudent to generate a statistical
model based on the data so that the effects of MCSE were reduced. The assumed statistical relationship
for QALYs lost from death due to COVID-19 is provided in Chapter 5, Estimating the discounted quality-
adjusted life-years lost from death due to COVID-19, with the assumed statistical relationship for the
expected QALYs that would be gained for those residents with severe, non-fatal COVID-19, if there
were no longer-term consequences, provided in Chapter 5, Estimating the discounted quality-adjusted
life-years gained after survival from severe, non-fatal COVID-19, assuming no long-term consequences.
Quality-adjusted life-year losses due to isolation within the residential
care facility
It was considered that time in isolation could have an important impact on residents of a residential
care facility, particularly elderly residents. This was explored by estimating a utility decrement
associated with increased depression or anxiety. It was assumed that all residents of the residential
care facility had some problems in the mobility, self-care, usual activities and pain dimensions of the
EQ-5D-3L (which were represented by a score of 2) and that half of the residents had a score of 2
for the anxiety dimension, with the remaining half having a score of 1. The decrease in utility when
increasing the score on the anxiety dimension was then explored. This resulted in a decrease in utility
(using the UK tariff) of 0.434 (0.516 – 0.082) for those who started with a score of 2 for anxiety and
a decrease in utility of 0.071 (0.587 – 0.516) for those who started with a score of 1 for anxiety.43
Having considered these values, the EAG deemed it reasonable that a resident’s utility was reduced
by 0.25 when in isolation. A sensitivity analysis was undertaken that assumed that there was no
disutility associated with isolation.
TABLE 9 The discounted quality-adjusted life-years lost and life-years lost associated with
death following COVID-19 at selected ages
Resident
age (years)
QALYs lost Life-years lost
Male Female Male Female
30 19.24 18.85 50.10 53.52
40 17.15 16.96 40.57 43.80
50 14.71 14.73 31.38 34.33
60 11.87 12.12 22.67 25.28
70 8.76 9.13 14.87 16.91
80 5.64 5.96 8.39 9.69
90 3.18 3.28 4.06 4.61
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The EAG acknowledges that isolation could affect utility beyond the isolation period, which means that
the QALYs lost because of isolation may be underestimated. However, the extent of any increased
anxiety about multiple lockdowns over and above the first lockdown is unknown.
Estimation of the proportion of bubbles penetrated by SARS-CoV-2
infection in the near future
Initial results from the Vivaldi study,13 reported by the Office for National Statistics,44 show that an
estimated 56% of care homes reported at least one confirmed case of COVID-19. However, this value may
not be generalisable to our decision problem, as some care homes are likely to have more than one bubble,
meaning that the reported value will be an overestimate of the penetration for the average bubble.
Additionally, it is unclear what effect changes in policy relating to a multitude of aspects, such as allowing
visitors to the residential care facility, would have on the anticipated proportion of bubbles that would
be penetrated. Given the large uncertainty, the EAG has decided that, in the base case, it should be
assumed that 50% of bubbles will be penetrated, although this will be changed in sensitivity analyses.
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Chapter 4 Modelling methodology
The strategies modelled
The strategies modelled were replicated for four broad sets of analyses. The first division was based on
the type of residential care facility modelled (i.e. en suite vs. shared rooms and facilities). The second
division was based on whether or not the bubble would be penetrated by SARS-CoV-2 infection
(i.e. a seeded model vs. a model without SARS-CoV-2 infection). It is acknowledged that whether or
not a residential care facility is penetrated cannot be known in advance; however, modelling in this
manner makes it easier to change the percentage of bubbles estimated to be penetrated in future
sensitivity analyses.
For each of the four combinations (en suite vs. shared, and penetrated vs. not), the strategies shown in
Table 10 were run. The following elements were common to all strategies: isolating all residents on the
identification of clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 and isolating all residents on receiving a
positive SARS-CoV-2 test. For all strategies except strategy 1 (the calibration strategy), it was assumed
that there was routine testing, that routine testing would be undertaken in residents in isolation and
that all residents would be tested when lockdown was initiated. If this option were selected, isolation
could be extended if an additional suspected COVID-19 case or positive SARS-CoV-2 test result came
back when the bubble was not in lockdown.




Type of SARS-CoV-2 test
used in routine testing
Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2
test as defined in . . .a
Allow early release
from isolation
1 N/Ab Calibration period No
2 Laboratory-based test TPP (desirable) No
3 POCT TPP (desirable) No
4 Laboratory-based test TPP (desirable) Yes
5 POCT TPP (desirable) Yes
6 Laboratory-based test TPP (acceptable) No
7 POCT TPP (acceptable) No
8 Laboratory-based test TPP (acceptable) Yes
9 POCT TPP (acceptable) Yes
10 Laboratory-based test Real-world evidence No
11 POCT Real-world evidence No
12 Laboratory-based test Real-world evidence Yes
13 POCT Real-world evidence Yes
N/A, not applicable.
a The model has not considered the possibility that less well-trained staff could increase the spread of SARS-CoV-2
when performing the tests. We have assumed that training has been undertaken within care home staff to mitigate
this (see Table 8).
b Laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests were used in testing only symptomatic residents.
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Calibration of the model
It is acknowledged that many parameter estimates are uncertain or have no data (such as effective
contact and attack rates). To attempt to provide meaningful results, the model was calibrated to obtain
results consistent with observed data by applying a calibration factor to the product of effective
contacts and attack rates.
Data from the Vivaldi report13 showed that, among the care homes that reported at least one case of
COVID-19, an estimated 19.9% (95% confidence interval 18.5% to 21.3%) of residents tested positive
for SARS-CoV-2, with this value being 6.9% (95% confidence interval 5.9% to 7.9%) for staff members.
However, the calibration target of the proportion of people with SARS-CoV-2 infection within strategy
1 (i.e. the calibration strategy) was chosen to be 40% for residents and 14% for staff. This value is
higher than that reported in the Vivaldi report,13 as the EAG acknowledges that many residential care
facilities may have more than one bubble and, if only one bubble had been penetrated, then the values
reported in the Vivaldi report13 would underestimate the true number of infections in a single bubble.
The calibration factors were 25 for en suite rooms and 20 for shared facilities, which resulted in 38%
of residents and 14% of staff being infected in the en suite scenario, and 40% of residents and 13%
of staff being infected in the shared-facilities scenario. As it was plausible that there would be more
infections of residents in shared facilities, this was deemed acceptable.
The number of different random number streams used per analysis
As with all individual patient-based models, there is the possibility of ‘first-order’ uncertainty, which
is the phenomenon that identical residents do not get identical outcomes because of the random
numbers drawn to simulate whether or not a resident has an event of interest. The results for a given
scenario will therefore change depending on the random number stream seed selected, as will the
comparative results with alternative strategies/scenarios, even when the same random number seed is
used, as the allocation of random numbers will differ between the strategies/scenarios. To reduce the
impact of random number streams, sufficient simulations, using different random number seeds, should
be undertaken.
Analyses were undertaken to assess the variability in the mean results as the number of simulations
was increased using a near-final version of the calibration model. Appendix 1, Figure 24, depicts the
average number of residents infected in the en suite residential care facility as the number of trials
increases. This analysis is replicated for the time spent in isolation (see Appendix 1, Figure 25). It is
believed that both outcomes have stabilised after 1000 random number streams, with no material
change in the number of residents infected between 800 and 1000 random number streams. This
conclusion was also reached for the shared facilities. There is a trade-off between decreased model
computation time and improved accuracy as more simulations with different random number streams
are undertaken. In this instance, we believed that 1000 random number streams were sufficient to
provide accurate estimates of the number of infections and days in isolation.
Note that the number of cases identified in the care home, as opposed to residents actually infected,
is a function of both the number of residents who become symptomatic and the diagnostic accuracy of
the SARS-CoV-2 test used.
The use of net monetary benefit
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios, being ratios of incremental costs divided by incremental QALYs,
can be misleading when incremental QALY gains are small, or when the estimated values are very close
between two interventions and one is stated to be dominating the other. Incremental net monetary
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benefit (NMB), defined as the cost per QALY threshold multiplied by the incremental QALY gain minus
the incremental cost,45 removes these limitations. For brevity, incremental NMB will be shortened
to NMB throughout this report. Under this framework, the largest NMB is associated with the most
cost-effective strategy at the stated cost-per-QALY threshold and multiple strategies can be compared
simultaneously, as the absolute difference in strategies in terms of NMB can be easily determined.
These analyses have been undertaken at assumed cost thresholds of £20,000, £30,000 and £50,000,
which are thresholds used in NICE technology appraisals,6 with the highest value used for treatments
meeting the end-of-life criteria. ICERs are presented for strategies that are believed to be comparable.
Potential wider societal benefits
In addition to the cost per QALY results required by NICE,6 the EAG is mindful of potential wider
societal benefits that may be associated with the decision problem. A number of aspects have not been
formally included in the cost and/or QALY calculations. These include the impacts of staff members not
being available to work because of symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 and subsequent isolation; the
impacts on the family of staff members who have symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 and subsequent
isolation; the potential for further spread of SARS-CoV-2 from infected staff members; the increased
burden on general practitioners; the increased burden on hospitals from staff members or those in a
chain of infection initiated by the staff member who was infected with SARS-CoV-2 and the potential
suspension of visitors to the residential care facility.
Some of these costs (i.e. general practitioners and hospital) will fall directly on the NHS, although the
EAG notes that the government will bear costs associated with staff members who need to self-isolate
through the government’s Adult Social Care Infection Control Fund,8 which can top up statutory sick
pay. Depending on the staff member required to self-isolate and their working pattern, this cost is
likely to be between £500 and £900 for a 10-day isolation period, based on pay estimates of £10 per
hour for care home workers and £16.50 per hour for a registered nurse.
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The estimated number of infections per strategy
Figure 2 provides the modelled number of SARS-CoV-2 infections for each of the 13 strategies listed
in Table 10 for the seeded en suite model. Figure 3 provides similar information for the seeded shared
facilities model. The number of SARS-CoV-2 infections for non-seeded models is, by definition, zero.
Strategy 1, which was believed to have been used in many care home facilities in the early response to
SARS-CoV-2 infection, has the largest number of infections. This was because there was no routine testing
and those with pre-symptomatic or asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection would not have been detected,
allowing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Given the assumption of the model that lockdown is initiated
at clinical symptoms or a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result, the numbers of SARS-CoV-2 infections for
strategies that do not allow early release from isolation are similar. The strategies that allow an early
















































FIGURE 3 The estimated number of infections per strategy for a shared facilities residential care facility.
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The results are not always intuitive; for example, at face value, one may expect that the desirable TPP
for a laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test would be to produce fewer SARS-CoV-2 infections than the
acceptable TPP, as it performs better on sensitivity, specificity and failure rates (see Table 8). However,
the decreased specificity for the acceptable TPP for the laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test means that
the residential care facility would enter lockdown more often than when the desirable TPP was used.
More frequent lockdowns decrease the spread of SARS-CoV-2 when the infected resident or staff
member is asymptomatic, resulting in fewer infections, but at the expense of days in isolation, which
may have a negative impact on residents.
The estimated days spent in isolation
The model records the days spent in isolation by the entire cohort. For the purposes of presentation,
we have assumed that there were no deaths within the bubble and have presented totals per resident
by dividing the cohort total by 16. These values per strategy for the seeded en suite model are provided
in Figure 4. Corresponding results for the seeded shared facility model, the non-seeded en suite model
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FIGURE 5 The estimated number of days in isolation per resident by strategy in the seeded shared facility model.
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The estimated number of SARS-CoV-2 tests performed
The number of tests performed in the seeded models were fairly similar, with the exceptions of
the calibration strategy, for which the number was smaller, as there was no routine testing and all
residents and staff were not tested following a suspected case or a positive SARS-CoV-2 test, and
the strategies that had a poorer specificity, for which the numbers were larger, as there was a larger
number of false-positive SARS-CoV-2 tests. Table 11 provides, to the nearest integer, the number
of tests performed for strategies 1–13 for en suite or shared facilities, and when seeded or not.
Estimating the discounted quality-adjusted life-years lost from death due
to COVID-19
The equation for QALYs lost from death due to COVID-19 is seen in Figure 8. The statistical fit was
very good, with an R2 of 0.986. The statistical model shown was forced to go through the origin to
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FIGURE 7 The estimated number of days in isolation per resident by strategy in the non-seeded shared facility model.
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Estimating the discounted quality-adjusted life-years gained after survival
from severe, non-fatal COVID-19, assuming no long-term consequences
The assumed statistical relationship of discounted QALYs gained after survival from severe, non-fatal
COVID-19, assuming no long-term consequences, is shown in Figure 9. As with the model for QALY
losses due to COVID-19 deaths, the statistical model was forced to go through the origin. Again, there
was a very good statistical fit, with an R2 of 0.981.




En suite (n) Shared facilities (n)
Seeded Non-seeded Seeded Non-seeded
1 7 1 8 1
2 250 215 263 215
3 248 214 261 214
4 258 224 264 221
5 255 223 263 221
6 277 262 287 262
7 279 262 287 262
8 287 271 288 269
9 289 272 288 269
10 241 191 255 191
11 251 215 265 215
12 247 195 254 194
13 261 225 265 223
Note
























0 2 4 6 8 10 1412 16
Number of infections
y = –0.0024x2 + 0.2638x
R2 = 0.986
FIGURE 8 The relationship between the number of SARS-CoV-2 infections and the QALYs lost from death due to COVID-19.
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Estimating the discounted quality-adjusted life-years lost for each strategy
and the costs for each strategy for all models
The QALY loss and the cost of testing for each strategy in the seeded en suite model are shown in
Table 12. Tables 13–15 provide similar information for the seeded shared facility model, the non-seeded
en suite model and the non-seeded shared facility model, respectively. The non-seeded models will not
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FIGURE 9 The relationship between the number of SARS-CoV-2 infections and the expected QALYs gained after severe,
non-fatal COVID-19, assuming long-term consequences.
TABLE 12 The QALY loss and cost of testing associated with each strategy in the seeded en suite model
QALY loss/cost of testing
Strategy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
QALYs lost due to
COVID-19 death
2.98 1.54 1.32 2.11 1.93 1.38 1.38 2.07 2.39 1.78 2.54 1.56 2.48
QALY loss post severe,
non-fatal COVID-19
0.30 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.26 0.16 0.25
QALY loss associated
with isolation
0.45 0.45 0.44 0.18 0.14 0.58 0.57 0.22 0.18 0.41 0.17 0.45 0.16
Total QALY loss 3.72 2.15 1.89 2.50 2.27 2.10 2.10 2.50 2.82 2.37 2.97 2.17 2.89
Cost of testing (£) 162 5500 5459 5677 5617 6099 6143 6323 6351 5298 5436 5521 5747
TABLE 13 The QALY loss and cost of testing associated with each strategy in the seeded shared facility model
QALY loss/cost of testing
Strategy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
QALYs lost due to
COVID-19 death
3.21 2.44 2.36 2.50 2.39 2.31 2.43 2.41 2.57 2.63 2.54 2.69 2.68
QALY loss post severe,
non-fatal COVID-19
0.32 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27
QALY loss associated
with isolation
0.44 0.51 0.50 0.28 0.26 0.61 0.60 0.34 0.30 0.48 0.51 0.27 0.27
Total QALY loss 3.97 3.19 3.09 3.03 2.89 3.16 3.28 2.99 3.13 3.37 3.31 3.23 3.21
Cost of testing (£) 172 5776 5741 5807 5781 6303 6314 6343 6337 5601 5820 5579 5834
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Estimating the implications of a bubble being penetrated
When a bubble is penetrated, there will be an increase in the number of SARS-CoV-2 infections and in the
time residents spend in isolation. The increase in the numbers of infections is provided in Figures 2 and 3.
By definition, there are no infections in the non-seeded group. However, isolation occurs in both groups.
Figure 10 provides the increase in isolation days that occurs when a bubble is penetrated by SARS-
CoV-2, which is the difference between Figures 4 and 6 for the en suite model and between Figures 5
and 7 for the shared facilities model. It can be seen that the strategies that use the acceptable TPPs
for one of laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests or SARS-CoV-2 POCTs only have a smaller increase in
isolation time, as more residents were isolated because of the larger number of false-positive tests.
TABLE 14 The QALY loss and cost of testing associated with each strategy in the non-seeded en suite model
QALY loss/cost of testing
Strategy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
QALY loss associated
with isolation
0.12 0.26 0.26 0.07 0.05 0.51 0.51 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.26 0.05 0.05
Cost of testing (£) 22 4728 4707 4918 4903 5755 5771 5972 5977 4208 4730 4297 4943
TABLE 15 The QALY loss and cost of testing associated with each strategy in the non-seeded shared facility model
QALY loss/cost of testing
Strategy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
QALY loss associated
with isolation
0.12 0.27 0.26 0.08 0.08 0.51 0.51 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.26 0.06 0.08
















































FIGURE 10 The number of additional isolation days per resident for penetrated bubbles vs. infection-free bubbles.
RESULTS
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
30
Estimating the cost-effectiveness of the strategies for given combinations
of residential care facility type and whether or not the bubble
is penetrated
For the seeded en suite model, the NMB values associated with each strategy are presented in Figure 11.
Corresponding results for the seeded shared facility model, the non-seeded en suite model and the
non-seeded shared facility model are provided in Figures 12–14, respectively.
As expected, the NMBs for all strategies in the seeded model are positive compared with strategy 1,
indicating that the strategies appear to result in ICERs below the thresholds stated when the bubble is
penetrated. Conversely, all NMBs in the non-seeded models are less than zero, indicating that, when
a bubble is not penetrated, the strategies do not result in ICERs lower than the thresholds stated
when the bubble remains free of SARS-CoV-2 infection. However, it is not known which bubbles will be
penetrated and which will not. The weighted average NMB for estimations of the proportion of bubbles












































FIGURE 12 The NMB associated with each strategy at stated cost-per-QALY thresholds for the seeded shared facility model.
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Results having assumed that the proportion of bubbles penetrated is 50%
The following subsections provide the estimated number of infections, the estimated days in isolation per
resident and the expected NMB for each strategy having assumed that 50% of bubbles are penetrated.
The results are provided for en suite residential care facilities and those with shared facilities.
The weighted number of expected infections per strategy
The weighted number of infections in the en suite residential care facility model per strategy is shown
in Figure 15. Figure 16 provides the same information for residential care facilities with shared facilities.
The weighted number of estimated days in isolation per resident
The weighted number of days in isolation for residents in the en suite residential care facility model per
strategy is shown in Figure 17. Figure 18 provides the same information for residential care facilities with
shared facilities.
The weighted net monetary benefit for each strategy
The weighted NMBs, assuming that 50% of bubbles are penetrated, in the en suite model per strategy









































FIGURE 14 The NMB associated with each strategy at stated cost-per-QALY thresholds for the non-seeded shared
facility model.
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FIGURE 17 The weighted number of days in isolation per resident per strategy, assuming that 50% of bubbles are
penetrated in the en suite model.
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FIGURE 18 The weighted number of days in isolation per resident per strategy, assuming that 50% of bubbles are
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FIGURE 20 The weighted NMB per strategy in the shared facility model.
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For en suite residential care facilities, all strategies have a positive NMB compared with strategy 1 and
the ranking of the strategies remains largely constant, independent of the cost per QALY threshold value
chosen. Strategy 3 (i.e. a SARS-CoV-2 POCT with a desirable TPP) has the highest expected NMB.
For residential care facilities with shared facilities, the NMBs are lower and some are negative, indicating
that some strategies (i.e. strategies 6 and 7) have ICERs greater than the £20,000 and £30,000 thresholds,
compared with strategy 1. These two strategies are when the laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and
the SARS-CoV-2 POCTs are at the acceptable TPP, questioning whether or not the acceptable TPP
requirement needs to be tightened or if this specific-use case should be excluded. The reason for
this result is the large NMB loss in the non-seeded scenario (see Figure 14), which is caused by the
additional days in isolation associated with the lower specificity of the acceptable TPPs. Strategy 5
(i.e. SARS-CoV-2 POCT with desirable a TPP and early release) has the highest expected NMB.
Key incremental cost-effectiveness ratios
The provided NMBs allow quick comparison of multiple strategies, but not all comparisons are informative.
For example, comparing the cost-effectiveness of a desirable TPP with an acceptable TPP at the same
price may provide little insight. The EAG has selected comparisons that it believes are pertinent to
inform the NICE Diagnostics Advisory Committee. These are presented in four blocks that reflect the
possible combinations of residential care facilities with en suite and shared facilities and assumptions
made regarding the early release of residents. Care must be taken in interpreting ICERs, particularly
those in the south-west quadrant of the cost-effectiveness plane, where QALYs are being lost and a
value greater than the threshold would be cost-effective (the reverse of standard rules), and also not
placing too much significance in ICERs when the absolute differences in costs and QALYs are small.
The results for residents in en suite residential care facilities are shown in Table 16. Table 17 provides
the results for residents in residential care facilities with shared facilities. In both tables, the incremental
TABLE 16 Selected base-case ICERs for the en suite residential care facility
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–31 0.13 Dominating –37 0.13 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
20 0.00 5621 17 –0.14 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
843 –0.10 Dominated 867 –0.17 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




372 0.04 9274 479 0.04 13,127
Laboratory-based test (D)
compared a with laboratory-
based test (RWE)
361 0.05 7672 431 0.22 1960
Laboratory-based test (A)
compared with a laboratory-
based test (RWE)
1184 –0.05 Dominated 1280 0.19 6791
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–42 0.14 Dominating –85 0.31 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with a
POCT (RWE)
831 –0.09 Dominated 819 0.01 71,483
A, acceptable TPP; D, desirable TPP; RWE, real-world evidence.
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costs and QALYs are those of the first test compared with the second test, and so in Table 16 a
laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test with a desirable TPP is assumed to incur £31 more cost and to
accrue 0.13 less QALYs than a SARS-CoV-2 POCT with a desirable TPP, and is dominated.
It is seen that the results are dependent on the diagnostic accuracy assumed for the laboratory-based
SARS-CoV-2 test and the SARS-CoV-2 POCT, as would be expected. For example, a SARS-CoV-2 POCT
with a desirable TPP dominates a laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test with a desirable TPP. However, a
SARS-CoV-2 POCT with an acceptable TPP is dominated by a laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test with
a desirable TPP.
Sensitivity analyses undertaken
There is considerable uncertainty relating to the parameters in the model. This has been explored
in sensitivity analyses, although these analyses were constrained by the deadlines for the report.
The change in the difference in key outcomes between the strategies may be informative to the
NICE Diagnostics Advisory Committee. Owing to time constraints, only selected strategies, types of
residential care facility and seeding options, were run. As there appeared to be no difference in the
conclusions between pairs of tests in the en suite or the shared facilities model (see Tables 16 and 17),
the sensitivity analyses were largely undertaken in the en suite version only.
TABLE 17 Selected base-case ICERs for the shared facilities residential care facility
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–34 0.05 Dominating –11 0.07 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
0 –0.06 Dominated 6 –0.06 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
779 –0.16 Dominated 801 –0.09 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




372 –0.03 Dominated 442 –0.00 Dominated
Laboratory-based
test (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
356 0.03 13,666 406 0.09 4767
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
1134 –0.08 Dominated 1202 0.06 21,108
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–50 0.11 Dominating –47 0.16 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
763 –0.11 Dominated 765 0.00 3,393,252
A, acceptable TPP; D, desirable TPP; RWE, real-world evidence.
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Ten sets of sensitivity analyses were undertaken to explore how the results of the model changed
when key assumptions related to key elements were altered. Five sets of sensitivity analyses required
the simulation model to be re-run. For the other five sets, the analyses could be undertaken with the
results produced when deriving the base-case results. The results for sensitivity analyses that did not
materially affect the conclusions are presented in Appendix 1.
The five sensitivity analyses that required new runs of the simulation model were (1) changing the age
of residents within the residential care facility, (2) changing the underlying rates of non-COVID-19
diseases that had symptoms suggestive of COVID-19, (3) assuming that a proportion of residents
within the residential care facility had immunity to SARS-CoV-2, potentially because of vaccination,
(4) changing the seed to a member of staff allocated to dealing with non-isolated residents and
(5) assuming that a lower proportion of people become symptomatic following SARS-CoV-2 infection.
The following five sensitivity analyses could be applied after the model has been run and therefore
results are provided for all of these strategies: (1) altering the proportion of bubbles that are assumed
to be penetrated, (2) changing the relative costs of laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and the costs
of SARS-CoV-2 POCTs, (3) assuming that there is no loss of QALYs for those residents who do not
die from COVID-19, (4) increasing the severity of consequences after severe COVID-19 infection
and (5) varying the QALY multiplier for residents who have had severe non-fatal COVID-19.
Exploring the effects of younger residents within the residential care facility
The base-case model focused on a residential care facility with elderly residents, although there are
residential care facilities that accommodate younger residents. An analysis was undertaken that
assumed a residential care facility with residents aged between 18 and 34 years, following a uniform
distribution. A recent PHE report46 reported that, for people with learning disabilities who are aged
18–34 years, who have been taken as a proxy for people in residential care facilities, the death rate
from COVID-19 was 6.3 times higher than that of the general population and all-cause mortality was
30 times higher than in the general population. These multipliers have been applied to the probabilities
in Tables 4 and 5. For simplicity, it has been assumed that 50% of residents aged 18–34 years in
residential care facilities are male.
As the only impacts of younger residents would be on the risk of death following severe COVID-19
and the QALYs lost because of COVID-19, only strategies 2–5 were run for the seeded en suite model.
Although there were fewer deaths in the younger resident scenario, the number of QALYs lost per
death was significantly larger (see Table 9), resulting in more QALY losses overall. However, the ranking
in terms of NMB, as shown in Appendix 1, Figure 26, has the same pattern as that in the base case
(see Figure 11), indicating similar rankings of strategies, albeit with higher NMBs.
Exploring the effects of assuming different rates of clinical symptoms suggestive of
COVID-19 that are not caused by SARS-CoV-2
The rate of clinical symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 in residents who do not have COVID-19 that
was used in the base case (0.00087 per day) is uncertain. It may be an underestimate, as it was taken
from residents with influenza-like illness only and other symptoms may suggest COVID-19. However,
the value may be an overestimate if clinical judgement of staff can determine that the resident does
not have COVID-19. In sensitivity analyses, we have used a value of 0.11 per day from Smith et al.12
As this change may have an impact on the relative cost-effectiveness of strategies with different
assumptions related to early release, strategies 4 and 5 were re-run for both the seeded and non-
seeded models. The number of infections reduced, as transmission reduced when residents were
isolated for non-COVID-19 diseases. The NMBs, compared with the strategy 4 unseeded model, are
shown in Appendix 1, Figure 27. The pattern between strategies 4 and 5 is similar to those in the base
case for both seeded (see Figure 11) and non-seeded (see Figure 12) en suite scenarios, indicating
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similar conclusions, although the NMBs were slightly smaller. For this reason, we did not re-run the
model with a lower value for the rate of symptoms suggestive of COVID-19 in residents who do not in
fact have COVID-19.
Exploring the effects of resident immunity from SARS-CoV-2 from vaccination
The model has the functionality to allow a proportion of residents and staff (simulated at an individual
person level) to be immune from SARS-CoV-2 infection. This will reduce the number of simulated
infections in two ways: (1) directly (i.e. owing to the immune person not becoming infected with
SARS-CoV-2) and (2) indirectly (i.e. if the person had been infected, they could have infected residents
and staff within the care home).
Analyses have been undertaken for both residential care facilities with en suites and for residential
care facilities with shared facilities; however, because of time constraints and because SARS-CoV-2
tests with acceptable TPPs performed poorly, only the first five strategies and strategies 10–13 have
been re-run. For each strategy, three levels of protection, in terms of the chance of becoming immune,
from receiving a vaccine have been explored: 50%, 70% and 90%. The method used may represent a
simplification, as immunity may not be as clear as fully immune or fully susceptible, and people may
be still susceptible after a vaccine; however, the impacts of COVID-19 are less severe. Additionally,
it has been assumed that the vaccine has reached full efficacy at the time of seeding the model with
SARS-CoV-2 infection. Despite the limitation in the results, it is believed that these analyses provide
useful information to the NICE Diagnostics Advisory Committee.
A further set of analyses has been conducted where it was assumed that a vaccine would not stop
a person from being infected with SARS-CoV-2, but that, for those who are symptomatic, it would
reduce the probability of severe outcomes by 50%, 70% or 90%. All results presented are weighted
assuming that 50% of bubbles are penetrated.
The analyses undertaken have shown that, if an effective vaccine is available for residential care
facility residents and staff, strategies with early release will become more favourable. Even at high
immunity levels (90%), it is still estimated that desirable TPPs and real-world evidence strategies for
both laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and SARS-CoV-2 POCTs can have positive NMB values at
willingness-to-pay levels of £30,000 per QALY and greater for the en suite residential care facility, and
at willingness-to-pay levels of £50,000 per QALY for the residential care facility with shared facilities.
Therefore, vaccination does not necessarily make SARS-CoV-2 POCTs redundant.
En suite residential care facilities
The number of resident infections in each vaccination scenario is provided in Figure 21. As anticipated,



































FIGURE 21 The weighted number of resident infections in each vaccination scenario for en suite residential care
facilities when the vaccine can confer immunity.
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The weighted NMB in each vaccination scenario (50%, 70% and 90% immunity) is provided in Appendix 1,
Figures 28–30. The rankings of NMB remain similar; however, the NMB is reduced and as immunity
increases the number of strategies with a negative NMB compared with strategy 1 increases.
It is seen that, as the efficacy of the vaccination increases, the NMB of the strategies, compared with
strategy 1, decreases. In addition, there is a clear NMB advantage for strategies that allow early
release from isolation (i.e. strategies 4, 5, 12 and 13). When efficacy is assumed to be 70%, only those
strategies with early release had a positive NMB, compared with strategy 1. However, when it is
assumed that efficacy was 90%, the willingness-to-pay threshold needs to be £50,000 per QALY or
higher for the NMB of early release strategies to be positive. However, these results are dependent on
the assumed 50% of bubbles being penetrated, with the NMB of strategies compared with strategy 1
improving as the proportion of bubbles penetrated increases, and vice versa.
The weighted NMB, which assumes that the vaccine reduces the proportion of COVID-19 cases that
are critical but does not affect transmission of SARS-CoV-2 for each vaccination scenario, is provided
in Appendix 1, Figures 31–33. It is observed that, as the proportion of COVID-19 cases that are critical
decreases, strategies that favour less time in isolation (i.e. strategies 4, 5, 8, 9, 12 and 13) become
more favourable, as QALY losses due to isolation begin to outweigh the QALY losses associated with
COVID-19. However, these results are dependent on the assumed 50% of bubbles being penetrated,
with the NMB of strategies compared with strategy 1 improving as the proportion of bubbles penetrated
increases, and vice versa.
Residential care facilities with shared facilities
The number of resident infections in each vaccination scenario is provided in Appendix 1, Figure 34.
As anticipated, the more immunity conferred by the vaccination, the smaller the number of infections.
The NMB in each vaccination scenario relating to immunity is provided in Appendix 1, Figures 35–37.
The interpretation of the results for the residential care facility with shared facilities is similar to that
of the en suite residential care facility, although there is a smaller NMB in that residents in shared facilities
are less likely to be released early than those in en suite residential care facilities, as release is dependent
on all members of the shared room being non-index cases and returning a negative SARS-CoV-2 test.
In addition, while under lockdown, SARS-CoV-2 infection can still be passed among residents in
shared rooms.
The NMBs in each vaccination scenario are provided in Appendix 1, Figures 38–40.
The interpretation of the results for the residential care facilities with shared facilities is similar to that
of the en suite residential care facility, although the NMB is lower in shared facilities because of the
increased time in isolation and there are smaller numbers of infections in the en suite model, as
infections are reduced in lockdown because of single-occupancy rooms.
Exploring the impacts of using a staff seed rather than a resident seed
In the base case, it was assumed that a resident was the seed when the bubble was penetrated by
SARS-CoV-2. A sensitivity analysis was conducted to explore the changes in results if it was assumed
that the seed was a staff member who attended to residents not in isolation. The NMBs for strategies
1–5 are provided in Appendix 1, Figure 41. The rankings are largely consistent with the base case, indicating
similar results, although the NMB was higher. Strategies 4 and 5 did relatively better than the base case.
Examining the results showed that a staff seed produced more SARS-CoV-2 infections in strategy 1, where
no routine testing was performed, but that strategies 2–5 had fewer SARS-CoV-2 infections, presumably
because of the weekly testing of staff members for SARS-CoV-2 infection.
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Exploring the impact of using a reduced proportion of residents infected with SARS-CoV-2
who develop clinical symptoms
As detailed in Chapter 3, The percentage of residents with SARS-CoV-2 who are assumed to develop clinical
symptoms, there is considerable uncertainty in the proportion of residents who are infected with
SARS-CoV-2 and develop COVID-19. To test the robustness of the results to changing this proportion,
an analysis was conducted using a lower proportion of residents becoming symptomatic (33%), which is
more in line with data from the Vivaldi report13 and the Office for National Statistics.16
In running this analysis, it was seen that the percentage of residents identified with SARS-CoV-2
infection could not reach the assumed calibration target of 40% (see Chapter 4, Calibration of the
model), as strategy 1 tests only residents with symptoms, which would be 33% of those infected. It
appears, therefore, that the Vivaldi13 data that relate to symptomatic residents may be inconsistent
with the proportion of residents reported as having COVID-19. This may be because the figure
reported was the number of residents testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 as a proportion of all residents
tested rather than as a proportion of symptomatic residents only. In this analysis, we reduced the
calibration target to 26%, which was attainable.
The NMBs for strategies 1–5 in the en suite model are provided in Appendix 1, Figure 42. Reassuringly,
the ranking of the strategies appears consistent, indicating that the proportion of people infected
with SARS-CoV-2 who develop COVID-19, although uncertain, does not greatly influence the results,
although the NMB decreases slightly.
Altering the proportion of bubbles assumed to be penetrated by SARS-CoV-2
The base case assumed that 50% of bubbles would be penetrated, although this value was highly
uncertain as it depends on a multitude of factors that cannot be predicted from historical data.
To provide a wide range for penetration of bubbles for the NICE Diagnostics Advisory Committee to
consider, two sensitivity analyses were run. The first assumed that 20% of bubbles were penetrated
and the second assumed that 80% of bubbles were penetrated. The results at 0% and 100% penetration
are those presented for the non-seeded residential care facilities and the seeded residential care
facilities, respectively. Although the conclusions regarding whether pairwise ICERs are above or below
stated thresholds often do not change, they do in some instances, showing that the cost-effectiveness
is sensitive to the proportion of bubbles penetrated. Appendix 1, Table 19, provides selected ICERs
for the en suite model assuming that 80% of bubbles are penetrated, and the weighted NMBs for the
en suite model are shown in Appendix 1, Figure 43. Appendix 1, Table 20 and Figure 44, provide the
equivalent information for the residential care facility with shared facilities.
The strategy with the highest NMB for the en suite residential care facility and the residential care
facility with shared facilities did not change when bubble penetration was increased to 80%. When
bubble penetration was decreased to 20%, strategies with an early release became more cost-effective
and strategy 5 had the highest NMB in the en suite residential care facility.
Appendix 1, Table 21, provides selected ICERs for the en suite model assuming that 20% of bubbles
are penetrated, and the weighted NMBs for the en suite model are shown in Appendix 1, Figure 45.
Table 22 and Figure 46 in Appendix 1 provide the equivalent information for the residential care facility
with shared facilities.
Changing the relative costs of laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and SARS-CoV-2
point-of-care tests
The relative costs of laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 tests and SARS-CoV-2 POCTs are uncertain
and therefore the EAG assumed that these were equal in the base case. Two sensitivity analyses
and threshold analyses were undertaken to assess the influence of costs of SARS-CoV-2 tests on
cost-effectiveness results.
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In the first set of sensitivity analyses, it was assumed that SARS-CoV-2 POCTs cost £10 more per test
than laboratory-based tests. In the second set of sensitivity analyses, it was assumed that laboratory-
based SARS-CoV-2 tests were £10 more expensive. In both analyses, the cheaper test was assumed
to cost £22.
The NMBs when the SARS-CoV-2 POCT is assumed to cost £10 more are shown in Appendix 1, Figure 47,
for the weighted en suite model and in Appendix 1, Figure 48, for the weighted shared facilities model.
As anticipated, the NMBs decreased further for POCTs than for laboratory-based tests, but the
strategy with the highest NMB did not change in the en suite residential care facility. However, in the
residential care facility with shared facilities, strategy 4 (i.e. laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test with
a desirable TPP and early release) has a higher NMB than its POCT counterpart at lower cost per
QALY thresholds.
The NMBs when the laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test is assumed to cost £10 more are shown in
Appendix 1, Figure 49, for the weighted en suite model and in Appendix 1, Figure 50, for the weighted
shared facilities model. As anticipated, the NMBs decreased further for laboratory-based tests than for
POCTs. The strategy with the highest NMB did not change in either the en suite residential care facility or
the residential care facility with shared facilities.
A threshold analysis was undertaken to provide the price difference (POCT cost minus laboratory-based
cost) at which the cost-effectiveness of selected comparisons equalled the stated threshold. Negative
values signify that the POCTwould need to be cheaper than the laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test.
The thresholds are given in Appendix 1, Tables 23 and 24, for the en suite and shared facilities models,
respectively. To aid interpretation, a POCT with a desirable TPP priced at £17 more than the laboratory-
based SARS-CoV-2 test with a desirable TPP would have the same NMB at a cost per QALY threshold
of £30,000. All values are presented to the nearest integer. It is seen that the comparative price
threshold for a SARS-CoV-2 POCT is dependent on the test characteristics for both SARS-CoV-2
POCTs and laboratory-based tests, the cost per QALY threshold assumed, and whether or not early
release is permitted.
Assuming that there is no loss of quality-adjusted life-years associated with either
non-fatal, severe COVID-19 or time spent in isolation
There is uncertainty related to the impact of non-fatal, severe COVID-19 in elderly residents of
residential care facilities and also the utility loss for residents from being in isolation. In the base
case, the EAG assumed that the expected QALYs accrued by a resident were 10% lower after non-
severe COVID-19 and that the utility loss was 0.25 for each day spent in isolation. In exploratory
analyses, it was assumed that neither non-fatal, severe COVID-19 nor isolation had an impact on
expected QALYs.
The NMBs for the en suite model are provided in Appendix 1, Figure 51, with selected pairwise ICERs
provided in Appendix 1, Table 25. It is noticeable that strategies 6 and 7, which have large periods of
isolation, do comparatively better under this sensitivity analysis. However, the strategy with the
highest NMB does not change from base case.
For the shared facilities model, results assuming that there are no QALY losses from non-fatal, severe
COVID-19 or from isolation are provided in Appendix 1, Table 26 and Figure 52. As with the en suite
model, strategies 6 and 7 do comparatively better under this sensitivity analysis. However, the strategy
with the highest NMB changes to strategy 6 (i.e. laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test with an acceptable
TPP), which, because of relatively poor specificity, requires considerably more time in isolation than
strategies with better diagnostic accuracy.
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Assuming greater quality-adjusted life-year losses due to death or non-fatal, severe COVID-19
It is known that some individuals are at greater risk from SARS-CoV-2 infection than others. This includes
those with certain comorbidities, as well as those from some minority ethnic groups. To allow insight into
whether or not the better strategies change when the risk from SARS-CoV-2 is increased, an analysis
was undertaken in which the QALYs lost from COVID-19, but not from isolation, were doubled. This
analysis was undertaken to implicitly take into consideration the fact that the number of people dying
from COVID-19 could be larger than in the base case, and that the proportion of people with COVID-19
who need hospitalisation could be greater in higher-risk groups. Selected pairwise ICERs are provided
in Appendix 1, Table 27, and the NMBs are provided in Appendix 1, Figure 53, for the weighted en suite
model. The rankings, in terms of NMB, are relatively constant, although strategies 6 and 7 do comparatively
better, as they have relatively fewer infections because of the increased time in isolation. The strategy with
the highest NMB does not change from the base case.
Results with greater QALY losses for the shared facilities model are provided in Appendix 1, Table 28
and Figure 54. As with the en suite model, strategies 6 and 7 do comparatively better under this
sensitivity analysis, although the strategy with the highest NMB does not change from base case.
Assuming a different multiplier for residents who have had severe, non-fatal COVID-19
The base case assumed that residents with severe, non-fatal COVID-19 would have their expected
QALYs diminished through one or both of shortened life expectancy or lower utility for their remaining
life. An arbitrary multiplier of 0.9 was used. Sensitivity analyses have been run assuming a multiplier
of 1.0 (indicating no loss of QALYs from COVID-19) and 0.8. These analyses have been conducted for
the en suite residential care facility only. There is little change in the interpretation of the ICERs when
the QALY multiplier was changed from 0.8 to 1.0, indicating that the results are not sensitive to this
parameter. ICERs are reported in Appendix 1, Tables 29 and 30, with the NMBs shown in Appendix 1,
Figures 55 and 56.
Assuming a halving of effective contacts and attack rate in the product
There is considerable uncertainty in both the attack rates and number of effective contacts, although
this was mitigated, to some extent, by the calibration undertaken (see Chapter 4, Calibration of the
model). Sensitivity analyses were undertaken with the product halved and compared with the start of
the pandemic. These analyses could represent better knowledge and protective equipment in limiting
the spread of SARS-CoV-2. The results produced were more favourable to the tests, as a large number
of infections at the beginning, before testing, was less likely, but the broad pattern between the
strategies was maintained (see Appendix 1, Figure 57).
Assuming that time spent in isolation is reduced from 14 days to 10 days
Following the completion of the initial work, the recommended number of days in isolation was
reduced from 14 to 10. Sensitivity analyses were undertaken to explore whether or not this had a
impact on the conclusions. The results produced were more favourable to the tests, as it was assumed
that the quality of life in patients would be improved by less time in isolation, but the broad pattern
between the strategies was maintained (see Appendix 1, Figure 58).
Exploring the use of lateral flow tests
In response to comments from peer reviewers and the emergence of new data on lateral flow tests
(see Chapter 3, Characteristics of the point-of-care tests and laboratory-based tests), exploratory analyses
were undertaken that assumed lateral flow tests were used every 5 days for both residents and staff
members. The results were compared with the desirable POCT assuming that there is no early release
from isolation (i.e. strategy 3) or early release from isolation (i.e. strategy 5). The NMB results for the
en suite residential care facility are shown in Figure 22, with the results in the residential care facility
with shared facilities shown in Figure 23. Summary results are shown in Table 18.
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FIGURE 23 Exploratory analyses assessing the NMB of lateral flow tests in residential care facilities with shared facilities.











POCT desirable 2.63 31.7 5083 1.08
POCT desirable – early release 3.94 8.7 5260 1.16
Lateral flow: PHE report31 0.87 23.8 6098 0.51
Lateral flow: PHE report31 –
early release
1.51 5.2 6122 0.49
Lateral flow: Cochrane review32 1.39 24.7 6115 0.67
Lateral flow: Cochrane review32 –
early release
2.83 6.3 6148 0.85
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POCT desirable 4.91 34.5 5223 1.68
POCT desirable – early release 4.93 15.5 5320 1.48
Lateral flow: PHE report31 2.97 30.3 6182 1.15
Lateral flow: PHE report31 –
early release
2.56 12.2 6171 0.85
Lateral flow: Cochrane review32 3.75 31.0 6203 1.36
Lateral flow: Cochrane review32 –
early release
3.69 13.4 6191 1.15
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Chapter 6 Discussion and conclusions
The EAG has constructed a mathematical model to simulate the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection inresidents and staff within a residential care facility. This model was developed following discussions
with clinical experts. The model was populated using the best data identified, and the model was calibrated
in an attempt to try and obtain plausible parameters where data were unknown; however, there is
considerable uncertainty in parameter population estimates. Therefore, the model results should be
viewed with caution and be taken as indicative rather than definitive. Sensitivity analyses have been
conducted to provide insight into the impact of uncertain parameter values.
The cost-effectiveness results are of limited value if the strategies evaluated are not realistic or the
SARS-CoV-2 POCTs do not meet requirements in terms of diagnostic accuracy or in the turnaround
time from the test being conducted to the result being known. For example, at the time of writing,
it is uncertain whether or not a SARS-CoV-2 POCT that meets the desirable, or even acceptable, TPP
will be available in the near future. It is imperative that diagnostic accuracy is established within the
context of residential care facilities, as the experience and qualification of the staff undertaking the
testing may influence the results.
Analyses using data from currently available SARS-CoV-2 POCTs and laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2
tests have been undertaken. Real-world results suggest that the NMB of both laboratory-based
SARS-CoV-2 tests and SARS-CoV-2 POCTs is greater than that of the acceptable TPPs.
If the SARS-CoV-2 POCT with desirable TPP existed, then it appears that it would have a relatively
high NMB, indicating that there is potential benefit associated with SARS-CoV-2 POCT. However, this
benefit is dependent on both the diagnostic accuracy and cost of any such tests that reach market.
The model has known limitations:
l Residents at high risk of severe consequences from SARS-CoV-2 infections were not
explicitly considered.
l Only one SARS-CoV-2 penetration could occur in seeded bubbles.
l Wider societal effects were not explicitly evaluated.
l The model updating cycle time (every 6 hours) may be too long to capture small differences in
turnaround times.
l The costs of hospitalisation were not considered.
l Additional aspects, including the reduced pressure on the health system and the infections of staff
members that can cascade into the community, have not been explicitly incorporated.
In addition, many other simplifying assumptions were made. Nevertheless, it is believed that broad
conclusions can be taken from the results presented.
The absence of relevant data limited our ability to explore subgroup analyses based on ethnicity or
comorbidities, although sensitivity analyses were undertaken that increased the risks from SARS-CoV-2.
Exploratory analyses were undertaken to assess lateral flow tests. These analyses show promising results,
but should be considered as indicative only because of the caveats listed in Chapter 3, Characteristics of
the point-of-care tests and laboratory-based tests, and in the light of recent data on poor adherence within a
care home setting.38 Diagnostic accuracy data within a residential care facility setting and more certainty
in the cost per lateral flow test would improve the robustness of the modelled results.
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In conclusion, SARS-CoV-2 POCTs have considerable potential for benefit for use within residential
care facilities, but whether or not this materialises is dependent on the diagnostic accuracy within
this setting and the costs of forthcoming SARS-CoV-2 POCTs. Vaccination does not necessarily make
SARS-CoV-2 POCTs redundant. In addition, a modelling structure has been developed, which is anticipated
to be useful for assessing the cost-effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2 POCTs within residential care facilities as
further information on their costs, turnaround times and diagnostic accuracy become known.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
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Appendix 1 Supplementary results
Estimating the number of random number streams at which stable results
are produced




























Number of random number streams































Number of random number streams
























FIGURE 26 The NMBs for selected strategies in the seeded en suite model when younger residents were assumed.
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Exploring the effects of a higher prevalence of clinical symptoms suggestive
of COVID-19 that are not caused by SARS-CoV-2
Exploring the effects of different vaccination protection assumptions

























FIGURE 27 The NMBs for selected strategies in the en suite model when a higher rate of diseases that are not COVID-19,




















FIGURE 28 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of immunity with the vaccine is 50% for en suite residential
care facilities.
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Exploring the effects of different vaccination protection assumptions
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FIGURE 31 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of critical COVID-19 with the vaccine is reduced by 50% for
en suite residential care facilities.
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Exploring the effects of different vaccination protection assumptions
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FIGURE 32 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of critical COVID-19 with the vaccine is reduced by 70% for
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FIGURE 33 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of critical COVID-19 with the vaccine is reduced by 90% for




































FIGURE 34 The weighted number of resident infections in each vaccination scenario for residential care facilities with
shared facilities.
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FIGURE 35 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of immunity with the vaccine is 50% for residential care
























FIGURE 36 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of immunity with the vaccine is 70% for residential care























FIGURE 37 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of immunity with the vaccine is 90% for residential care
facilities with shared facilities.
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Exploring the effects of different vaccination protection assumptions



















FIGURE 38 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of critical COVID-19 with the vaccine is reduced by 50% for



















FIGURE 39 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of critical COVID-19 with the vaccine is reduced by 70% for



















FIGURE 40 The weighted NMB assuming that the chance of critical COVID-19 with the vaccine is reduced by 90% for
residential care facilities with shared facilities.
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Exploring the effects of having the seed as a staff member rather than
as a resident
Exploring the effects of assuming that a lower proportion of residents with






















FIGURE 41 The NMBs for selected strategies in the seeded en suite model when it was assumed that the seed was a























FIGURE 42 The NMBs for selected strategies in the seeded en suite model when it was assumed that 33% of people
with SARS-CoV-2 infection became symptomatic.
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Exploring the effects of assuming that a higher proportion of residential
care facilities were penetrated by SARS-CoV-2
TABLE 19 Selected ICERs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that 80% of bubbles are penetrated
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–37 0.21 Dominating –51 0.19 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
34 0.00 13,892 24 –0.25 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
723 –0.01 Dominated 751 –0.26 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




282 0.14 2051 378 0.06 6191
Laboratory-based
test (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
265 0.15 1776 317 0.37 862
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
954 0.14 6773 1044 0.36 2921
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–54 0.22 Dominating –113 0.49 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
705 0.01 127,175 690 0.05 14,547




















FIGURE 43 The weighted NMBs for the en suite residential care facility when it was assumed that 80% of bubbles were
penetrated by SARS-CoV-2.
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TABLE 20 Selected ICERs for the shared-facilities residential care facility assuming that 80% of bubbles are penetrated
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–35 0.08 Dominating –20 0.12 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
7 –0.09 Dominated –1 –0.11 12a
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
634 –0.12 Dominated 639 –0.10 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




280 0.03 11,047 330 0.01 42,515
Laboratory-based
test (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
247 0.12 2096 299 0.15 1978
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
875 0.10 9092 939 0.16 5721
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–67 0.17 Dominating –51 0.26 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
602 –0.02 Dominated 608 0.05 12,596
A, acceptable TPP; D, desirable TPP; RWE, real-world evidence.






















FIGURE 44 The weighted NMBs for the residential care facility with shared facilities when it was assumed that 80% of
bubbles were penetrated by SARS-CoV-2.
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Exploring the effects of assuming that a lower proportion of residential
care facilities were penetrated by SARS-CoV-2
TABLE 21 Selected ICERs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that 20% of bubbles are penetrated
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–25 0.06 Dominating –24 0.06 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
5 0.00 1183 10 –0.03 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
963 –0.19 Dominated 982 –0.08 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)









456 –0.06 Dominated 544 0.07 7589
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
1414 –0.25 Dominated 1517 0.02 77,050
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–30 0.06 Dominating –58 0.12 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
957 –0.18 Dominated 948 0.02 Dominated
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FIGURE 45 The weighted NMBs for the en suite residential care facility when it was assumed that 20% of bubbles were
penetrated by SARS-CoV-2.
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TABLE 22 Selected ICERs for the residential care facility with shared facilities assuming that 20% of bubbles are
penetrated
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–33 0.03 Dominating –2 0.03 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
–6 –0.02 344a 12 –0.01 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
923 –0.21 Dominated 964 –0.08 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




464 –0.09 Dominated 554 0.01 Dominated
Laboratory-based
test (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
464 –0.07 Dominated 514 0.02 26,679
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
1393 –0.26 Dominated 1465 –0.05 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–33 0.04 Dominating –43 0.07 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
924 –0.19 Dominated 923 –0.05 Dominated
A, acceptable TPP; D, desirable TPP; RWE, real-world evidence.
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FIGURE 46 The weighted NMBs for the residential care facility with shared facilities when it was assumed that 20% of
bubbles were penetrated by SARS-CoV-2.
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FIGURE 47 The weighted NMBs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that SARS-CoV-2 POCTs cost £10
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FIGURE 48 The weighted NMBs for the residential care facility with shared facilities assuming that SARS-CoV-2 POCTs
cost £10 more than in the base case.
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FIGURE 49 The weighted NMBs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2
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FIGURE 50 The weighted NMBs for the residential care facility with shared facilities assuming that laboratory-based
SARS-CoV-2 tests cost £10 more than in the base case.
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Estimating the cost of SARS-CoV-2 point-of-care tests that would produce
the same net monetary benefit as laboratory-based tests
TABLE 23 Threshold values for the cost of a SARS-CoV-2 POCT minus the cost of a laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test
at which the NMB are equal at the stated threshold: en suite model
Tests compared
No early release permitted (£) Early release permitted (£)
£20,000 £30,000 £50,000 £20,000 £30,000 £50,000
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
11 17 29 11 16 27
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
0 0 1 –10 –15 –25
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–10 –14 –21 –15 –21 –34
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
24 34 54 17 23 37
POCT (RWE) compared with
a laboratory-based test (RWE)
2 4 7 1 3 6
A, acceptable TPP; D, desirable TPP; RWE, real-world evidence.
TABLE 24 Threshold values for the cost of a SARS-CoV-2 POCT minus the cost of a laboratory-based SARS-CoV-2 test
at which the NMB are equal at the stated threshold: shared facilities model
Tests compared
No early release permitted (£) Early release permitted (£)
£20,000 £30,000 £50,000 £20,000 £30,000 £50,000
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
5 7 11 6 9 15
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
–4 –6 –10 –4 –6 –11
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–15 –21 –32 –9 –12 –19
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
17 23 37 12 16 25
POCT (RWE) compared with
a laboratory-based test (RWE)
–4 –5 –8 –2 –2 –2
A, acceptable TPP; D, desirable TPP; RWE, real-world evidence.
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Exploring the effects of assuming that there are no quality-adjusted
life-year losses from isolation or non-fatal, severe COVID-19
TABLE 25 Selected ICERs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that there are no QALY losses from isolation
or non-fatal, severe COVID-19
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–31 0.11 Dominating –37 0.09 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
20 –0.00 Dominated 17 –0.16 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
843 0.08 10,290 867 –0.14 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




372 0.11 3401 479 0.03 17,127
Laboratory-based
test (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
361 0.12 3094 431 0.21 2011
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
1184 0.20 5950 1280 0.23 5474
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–42 0.12 Dominating –85 0.27 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
831 0.09 9377 819 0.04 18,541
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FIGURE 51 The weighted NMBs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that there are no QALY losses from
isolation or non-fatal, severe COVID-19.
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TABLE 26 Selected ICERs for the residential care facility with shared facilities assuming that there are no QALY losses
from isolation or non-fatal, severe COVID-19
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–34 0.04 Dominating –11 0.06 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
0 –0.06 Dominated 6 –0.08 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
779 0.00 195,754 801 –0.04 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




372 0.05 8037 442 0.01 79,688
Laboratory-based
test (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
356 0.10 3677 406 0.09 4285
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
1134 0.16 7187 1202 0.14 8754
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–50 0.09 Dominating –47 0.15 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
763 0.05 14,010 765 0.05 14,527
A, acceptable TPP; D, desirable TPP; RWE, real-world evidence.























FIGURE 52 The weighted NMBs for the residential care facility with shared facilities assuming that there are no QALY
losses from isolation or non-fatal, severe COVID-19.
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Exploring the effects of assuming that the quality-adjusted life-year losses
associated with COVID-19 are doubled
TABLE 27 Selected ICERs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that QALY losses from COVID-19 are doubled
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–31 0.25 Dominating –37 0.22 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
20 0.00 6607 17 –0.32 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
843 –0.01 Dominated 867 –0.33 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




372 0.16 2319 479 0.07 7134
Laboratory-based
test (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
361 0.18 2059 431 0.45 947
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
1184 0.17 7102 1280 0.45 2877
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–42 0.27 Dominating –85 0.61 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
831 0.01 90,749 819 0.06 13,676























FIGURE 53 The weighted NMBs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that QALY losses from COVID-19
are doubled.
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TABLE 28 Selected ICERs for the residential care facility with shared facilities assuming that that QALY losses from
COVID-19 are doubled
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–34 0.10 Dominating –11 0.14 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
0 –0.12 Dominated 6 –0.15 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
779 –0.16 Dominated 801 –0.13 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




372 0.02 17,865 442 0.00 135,211
Laboratory-based
test (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
356 0.13 2694 406 0.19 2149
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
1134 0.09 12,137 1202 0.21 5795
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–50 0.21 Dominating –47 0.32 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
763 –0.05 Dominated 765 0.06 13,210
























FIGURE 54 The weighted NMBs for the residential care facility with shared facilities assuming that QALY losses from
COVID-19 are doubled.
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Exploring the effects of assuming that there are no quality-adjusted
life-year losses associated with severe, non-fatal COVID-19
TABLE 29 Selected ICERs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that there are no QALY losses from non-fatal,
severe COVID-19
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–31 0.12 Dominating –37 0.12 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
20 0.00 5546 17 –0.12 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
843 –0.10 Dominated 867 –0.16 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)




372 0.03 12,730 479 0.03 14,169
Laboratory-based
test (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
361 0.04 10,186 431 0.20 2164
Laboratory-based
test (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test
(RWE)
1184 –0.07 Dominated 1280 0.17 7719
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–42 0.13 Dominating –85 0.28 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
831 –0.10 Dominated 819 0.01 113,688























FIGURE 55 The weighted NMBs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that there were no QALY losses from
non-fatal, severe COVID-19.
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Exploring the effects of assuming that the multiplier for a quality-adjusted
life-year gain following severe, non-fatal COVID-19 was 0.8 of the
age-matched population
TABLE 30 Selected ICERs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that there are no QALY losses from
non-fatal, severe COVID-19
Tests compared









POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
–31 0.14 Dominating –37 0.13 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)
20 0.00 5699 17 –0.16 Dominated
POCT (A) compared with
a laboratory-based test (D)
843 –0.09 Dominated 867 –0.19 Dominated
POCT (D) compared with
a laboratory-based test (A)














1184 –0.03 Dominated 1280 0.21 6063
POCT (D) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
–42 0.15 Dominating –85 0.34 Dominating
POCT (A) compared with
a POCT (RWE)
831 –0.08 Dominated 819 0.02 52,131























FIGURE 56 The weighted NMBs for the en suite residential care facility assuming that there were no QALY losses from
non-fatal, severe COVID-19.
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Exploring the effects of halving effective contacts and attack rate in
the product
















































FIGURE 58 The NMBs for selected strategies in the seeded en suite model when the time spent in isolation was reduced
from 14 days to 10 days.
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